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I. INTRODUCTION
Effective October 1, 1987, all new Montana corporations and
all existing Montana corporations with twenty-five or fewer share-
holders may elect the special benefits of the Montana Close Corpo-
19881
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ration Act.1 The Montana Close Corporation Act is virtually iden-
tical to the American Bar Association's Model Statutory Close
Corporation Act. Benefits available to all corporations electing cov-
erage under the MCCA include increased assurances against loss of
shareholder's limited liability, statutorily sanctioned restrictions
on transfer, and decreased corporate formalities. The MCCA also
includes optional provisions which permit corporations to operate
as a partnership, to abolish the board of directors, or to operate
with a statutorily mandated repurchase of shares upon the death
of shareholders. The MCCA is particularly suited for Montana be-
cause most Montana businesses are small businesses. This article
analyzes (1) the problems faced by close corporations which are
not adequately addressed by the Montana Business Corporation
Act,2 (2) how the MCCA addresses those problems and (3) de-
scribes when corporations should elect the benefits of the MCCA.
II. PROBLEMS OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND PRE-MCCA
ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS
Close corporations are a special breed of corporations with a
special set of problems. Although many commentators have offered
different definitions of the term "close corporation," no one defini-
tion is universally accepted.3 A common thread, however, through
most definitions is that close corporations resemble "incorporated
partnerships." The Montana Supreme Court definition of close
corporation properly focuses upon the relationship between man-
agement and ownership: "a close corporation is one in which the
management and ownership are 'substantially identical to the ex-
tent that it is unrealistic to believe that the judgment of directors
will be independent of that of the stockholders.' ""' The Supreme
Court's definition of a close corporation highlights the fundamen-
tal problem of close corporations. Because close corporations usu-
ally have identical ownership and management, forcing close cor-
1. The Montana Close Corporation Act, for the sake of brevity, will be referred to as
MCCA. MCCA has been codified as MONT. CODE ANN. ch. 9, tit. 35 (1987).
2. Prior to the MCCA, all business corporations incorporated in Montana operated
under the provisions of the Montana Business Corporation Act found at Chapter 1 of Title
35 of the Montana Code Annotated. Under MCCA, electing corporations will operate under
MONT. CODE ANN. ch. 9, tit. 35 (1987) and to the extent it has not been modified by chapter
9, MONT. CODE ANN. ch. 1, tit. 35 (1987).
3. 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (3d ed. 1987); see also Israels, The Close
Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 491 (1948).
4. Thisted v. Tower Mgmt. Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 14, 409 P.2d 813, 820 (1966) (quoting
Symposium, The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345 (1957)). See also Gray v. Harris
Land & Cattle Co., - Mont. , -, 737 P.2d 475, 476 (1987); Skierka v. Skierka
Bros., - Mont ____, 629 P.2d 214, 221 (1981).
[Vol. 49
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porations to comply with the Montana Business Corporation Act is
like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.5 Specifically, close
corporations face these problems:
Potential loss of limited liability. When owners of a corpora-
tion disregard corporate formalities and undercapitalize the cor-
poration, there is a risk the courts will "pierce the corporate veil"
by holding owners liable for the debts of the corporation.'
Shift of decisionmaking from a consensus of the owners to a
majority of owners. When the owners collectively own the corpo-
rations, they usually expect to make decisions by consensus. The
Montana Business Corporation Act, however, gives the majority
shareholders virtually all of the power to control the business, to
the exclusion of the minority.'
Difficulty in retaining control within the original group of
owners. When all shareholders agree that each will have a voice in
management, owners usually desire to limit transfers to outsiders.
Stock in corporations, however, is usually freely transferable.8
Difficulty of shareholders to realize the value of their invest-
ment. Because there is no established market for close corpora-
tion stock, shareholders and their estates have difficulty realizing
the value of their investment.'
Difficulty in resolutions of owner deadlock. Deadlock be-
tween directors and shareholders does not pose a significant prob-
lem for publicly held corporations as disgruntled shareholders can
easily sell their shares. Because of the small number of sharehold-
ers and directors in most close corporations, deadlocks more fre-
quently occur.'0 Unfortunately, the Montana Business Corpora-
tion Act does not provide courts with the necessary tools to
resolve deadlocks.1'
While courts and legislatures have been aware of these problems,
until the passage of the MCCA, they have failed to remedy fully
these problems.
5. This comparison between close corporations and the state corporation laws was first
noted in Wolens, A Round Key-A Square Hole: The Close Corporation and the Law, 22
Sw. L.J. 811 (1968).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 104-122.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 129-133.
10. In 1968, Montana adopted new corporation law "derived in large measure from the
Model Business Corporation Act of the American Bar Association modified to meet the spe-
cific needs of this state." Note, Introduction to the Montana Business Corporation Act, 29
MONT. L. REV. 163 (1968) (authored by James A. Poore III).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 92-102.
19881
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A. Legislative Efforts to Address Problems of Close
Corporations
The authors of the Model Business Corporation Act and the
Montana Legislature have attempted to provide for the problems
of close corporations. The American Bar Association has promul-
gated changes in the Model Business Corporation Act to enable
incorporators to tailor the governing documents of a close corpora-
tion to meet their special needs. These provisions, adopted in 1968
by the Montana legislature as part of the Montana Business Cor-
poration Act, permitted the articles of incorporation to include
provisions restricting the transfer of shares" and permitting ac-
tions by shareholders and directors without meetings. 13 The Model
Business Corporation Act allows those drafting charter documents
for close corporations the ability to tailor articles for some of the
needs of the corporation. Prior to the MCCA, Montana had not
opted for a separate statutory scheme for close corporations as had
many other states.1 ' While the authors1 5 of the Model Business
Corporation Act may have believed these special provisions ade-
quately addressed the needs of close corporations,16 experience
demonstrates the deficiencies of the Model Business Corporation
Act.17
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-202(1)(h) (1978). This provision was deleted in 1981 in
favor of MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-617 (1987) which broadened the rules concerning restric-
tion on transfers of shares.
13. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-405, -509 (1987); See text, supra note 10.
14. See Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1948);
Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 305, 339
(1937); Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REV. 173
(1929); Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28 CORNELL L. REV. 313
(1943).
15. One might speculate those drafting the Model Business Corporation Act did not
have the needs of close corporations in mind. The Act was largely drafted by three members
of the Chicago bar, Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act, 6 Bus. LAW. 1 (1950), at least two of which practiced in the LaSalle Street finan-
cial district. Id. at i.
16. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 35 Special Comment-Close Corporation
(2d ed. 1971). See also Karjala, A Second Look at Special Close Corporation Legislation, 58
TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1227 (1980).
It is interesting to note that by adopting the Model Business Corporation Act, the Mon-
tana legislature actually removed a provision of the then existing law tailored to the special
needs of close corporations. The adoption of the Model Business Corporation Act cancelled
Montana's close corporation special dissolution provision, REV. CODE MONT. § 15-1119
(1947), that allowed any shareholder who owned greater than 25 percent of the shares for
more than six months to file for dissolution. This provision did not apply "to any corpora-
tion whose capital stock is offered to the public or to any corporation whose stock is listed
on any established stock exchange."
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Faced with the growing awareness of the reality of shareholder
management of a close corporation, in 1981 the Montana legisla-
ture adopted the American Bar Association endorsed amend-
mentsi" to the Model Business Corporation Act that provided for
some of the needs of close corporations. At the same time, the leg-
islature enacted two significant deviations from the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act in order to further accommodate the special
problems of close corporations.19 The first provision,20 based on
New York Corporation Law, 21 allows shareholders to restrict the
power of the board of directors to manage the corporation. The
statute allows the shareholders to delegate board authority to
themselves or one or more persons selected by the shareholders.
Significantly, the provision modifies the common law rule that di-
rectors cannot delegate certain board powers.2 This provision,
however, does not adequately address the problems of close corpo-
rations.23 It does not address the problem of keeping control of the
business within the original shareholder group and does not pro-
vide the courts with broad equitable powers to resolve disputes. In
addition, while the statute addresses the desire of certain share-
holders to dispense with a board of directors, it also imposes liabil-
18. For example the Montana Business Corporation Act was amended to eliminate the
requirement of three directors and replace it with a requirement of only one director. The
new amendments also allowed private voting agreements between shareholders. See also
Beed, Brown, & Wyse, Significant Changes in the Montana Business Corporation Act and
the Montana Limited Partnership Act, 19 MONT. Bus. Q. 29 (Winter 1981).
19. In describing the need for one of these deviations from the ABA Model Act, the
Official Comments to the Montana Business Corporation Act state:
As most Montana corporations are closely held and have the shareholders serving
directly as officers and directors, the formal distinction between directors and
shareholders, as contemplated by present law, is meaningless. In addition, the pre-
sent system in small corporations requires unnecessary special meetings of the
board, properly documented, which typically are prepared after the fact, if at all.
Montana Legislative Council, MONT. CODE ANN. Annotations § 35-1-515, at 70 (1985).
20. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-515 (1987).
A provision in the articles of incorporation otherwise prohibited by law because it
improperly restricts the board of directors in its management of the business of
the corporations or improperly transfers to one or more shareholders . . . all or
any part of such management, otherwise within the authority of the board under
this chapter shall nevertheless be valid [if certain requirements are met].
21. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 620 (McKinney 1986). The law in New York was defined as
the "most important accommodation to the close corporation's peculiar needs." Kessler,
The Shareholder-Managed Close Corporation Under the New York Business Corporation
Law, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 197 (1974). The provision expanded the common law created in
Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) by upholding unanimous shareholder
agreements that infringe on the board of directors' direct powers. The new provision also
overruled the subsequent decision in Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres
Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948).
22. See infra note 40.
23. Kessler, supra note 21, at 215.
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ity on those shareholders for the managerial acts (or omissions) of
the delegatee. Possibly as a result, this section of the statutes has
almost gone unused by close corporations in Montana.25
In the second significant departure from the Model Business
Corporation Act, the Montana legislature borrowed from Delaware
law a provision which allows a corporation to restrict the transfera-
bility of stock. 6 This provision promulgates rules governing when
restrictions on transfers of stock are allowed and explicitly permits,
among other restrictions, rights of first refusal, consent restrictions
and mandatory purchase upon death. The statute provides more
certainty than the common law rule which enforces only reasona-
ble restrictions .2  These restrictions allow close corporations to
keep the business "in the family" by restricting the ability of
shareholders to transfer their stock to others without the consent
of other shareholders or without first offering it to the corporation.
Close corporations represented by attorneys experienced with busi-
ness law commonly use these restrictions.
Recognizing a continuing need in Montana for a separate set
of corporation laws specifically governing close corporations, 8 the
Montana legislature adopted the new Montana Close Corporation
Act in 1987. The MCCA is virtually identical to the American Bar
Association Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, 9 ex-
24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-515(5) (1987). This liability is imposed only if the share-
holders voted for the delegation of power. As a result, inactive shareholders are hesitant to
authorize the election of the provisions of MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-515 (1987) and if they do
authorize the delegation of board powers, they may be liable, as directors, for actions taken
by majority shareholders which are beyond the control of minority shareholders. The Mon-
tana Close Corporation Act, on the other hand, expressly states that shareholders are "not
liable for [a director's] act or omission, even though a director would be, unless the share-
holder was entitled to vote on the action." MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-30 2 (3)(c) (1987).
25. Reliable statistics identifying the numbers of Montana corporations electing the
benefits of MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-515 (1987) do not exist because these statistics are not
compiled by the Secretary of State. The authors' review of all incorporations in January of
1985 failed to reveal any provision in any of the Articles of Incorporation authorizing the
control of directors by shareholders as permitted by the statute.
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-617 (1987). The Delaware provision has subsequently
been substantially incorporated into the Revised Model Business Corp. Act (1984) at § 6.27.
27. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witters, - Ohio Misc. - , 105 N.E.2d
685 (Ct. Common Pleas 1952) for a good discussion of the common law.
28. As second-year law students, Amy N. Guth and Marcelle Compton Quist success-
fully pursued the adoption of the American Bar Association's Model Statutory Close Corpo-
ration Act after a lecture in a corporations course at the University of Montana School of
Law. Ms. Guth and Ms. Quist, with the support of Professor Steven C. Bahls, lobbied for
the enactment of the Montana Close Corporation Act. Representative Gary L. Spaeth, of
Silisea, sponsored the bill in the House. Senator Joseph P. Mazurek, of Billings, sponsored
the bill in the Senate. The bill was easily approved by the legislature, was signed by the
governor, and, on October 1, 1987, became law.
29. The American Bar Association Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement,
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cept that the MCCA provides that an existing corporation may
elect its benefits if the corporation has twenty-five or less share-
holders,30 while the ABA Supplement uses fifty as the maximum
number.3' New corporations may have any number of shareholders
and still elect the provisions of the Act.32
Currently only one other state, Wisconsin, has adopted the
ABA Model Act. Twenty-three other states, however, have adopted
either separate or integrated close corporation provisions.- S Signifi-
cantly, with the adoption of the MCCA, Montanans need not in-
corporate their business in another state in order to realize the
flexibility and protections heretofore afforded only by those states
adopting special provisions for close corporations.3
B. Judicial Efforts to Address Problems of Close Corporations
The Montana legislature was not alone in recognizing the spe-
cial problems facing close corporations. Commentators, as well as
the courts of Montana and other states, have recognized the need
for flexibility in the application of corporate statutes to problems
faced by close corporations. 5
for the sake of brevity, will be referred to as the ABA Supplement.
30. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-103 (1987). At the request of Rep. Kelly Addy, of Billings,
the bill was amended in the House Judiciary Committee to 25 shareholders to attempt to
exclude any corporations that may not be "close corporations." No other changes were pro-
posed or adopted in the legislative process.
Once a corporation elects statutory close corporation status, it is able to retain that
status even if it has more than 25 shareholders. See 4 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.,
Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement (hereinafter referred to as the ABA SUPPLE-
MENT COMMENTS), § 3, comment at 1811 (1984) (corresponding to MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-9-
103 (1987)).
31. ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 3 (1984).
32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-103(1) (1987).
33. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.15. These provisions are generally more detailed and
comprehensive than MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-515 (1987).
34. The benefits of Montana based corporations incorporating in Montana rather than
in another state include: (1) all fees and costs generate income to Montana, (2) only one
report is required (foreign corporations doing business in Montana must be registered, pro-
duce annual reports and pay fees in both Montana and the other state) and (3) because
foreign law governs foreign corporations, litigation involving those corporations is often
brought in foreign courts. Although the defendants may argue the doctrine forum non con-
viens applies, courts in some states are quick to reject those arguments. Parvin v. Kauf-
mann, 43 Del. Ch. 461, 236 A.2d 425 (Sup. Ct. 1967). Some attorneys, however, regard the
absence of an anti-takeover law as a disadvantage of incorporation in Montana.
35. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.20. See also Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate
Cloak: The Emergence & Legitimacy of the Incorporated Partnership, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 559
(1984).
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1. Judicial Trends Generally
The two most significant trends in common law regarding
close corporations are the recognition of a fiduciary duty owed by
majority stockholders to minority shareholders and the sanctioning
of agreements among the shareholders to limit the power of the
board. Numerous courts have determined that controlling share-
holders in a close corporation owe a fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders, just as partners in a partnership owe each other fidu-
ciary duties.36 For example, although Massachusetts statutes did
not explicitly provide for a fiduciary duty between shareholders,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in the landmark case
of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.3 7 held that shareholders in
close corporations owe one another a fiduciary duty. Generally, at
common law, shareholders in their capacity as shareholders did not
owe a fiduciary duty to others and could act in their own self inter-
est. 8 Likewise, the Montana Business Corporation Act does not
provide for a fiduciary duty between shareholders, but only pro-
vides for a fiduciary duty of directors to the corporation and its
shareholders.3 9 Cases like Donahue create a fiduciary duty between
shareholders not found in most state statutes.
In the second trend, the courts enforce agreements between
shareholders which effectively restrict the power of the board.
Under previous law, courts were hesitant to enforce agreements
which unduly restricted the power of management."' Typical of the
36. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATION § 268 (3d ed. 1983).
37. 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975). The court held stockholders in the
close corporations owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duties in the operation
of an enterprise that partners owe to one another. Id. See also Holms v. Duckworth, 249
F.2d 482, 486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Gord v. Iowana Farms Milk Co., 245 Iowa 1, 60 N.W.2d
820 (1953).
38. Litwin v. Allen, - A.D. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See
Tarver, The Arrogance of Corporate Power: A Study of the Evolution of Fiduciary Duty
Owed by Management to the Corporation or its Shareholders, 42 TUL. L. REV. 155 (1967);
Note, Fiduciary Duties of Majority or Controlling Stockholder, 44 IOWA L. REV. 734 (1959).
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401(2) (1987).
40. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 36, § 275, at 744-45. See also Hornstein,
Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely-Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1950). See
also Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214 (D.C. Del. 1971); Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch.
599, 123 A.2d 893 (Ch. Ct.), modified, 36 Del. Ch. 102, 125 A.2d 588 (Ch. Ct. 1956), rev'd on
other grounds, 136 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957). Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-
New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948); McQuade v. Stoneham,
263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Fells v. Kutz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931); Red-
mond v. Redmond, 42 A.D.2d 542, 345 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1973); In re Hirshon's Will, 220 A.D.2d
451, 221 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1961), aff'd, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1962), modified, 13 N.Y.2d
787, 192 N.E.2d 173, 242 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1963). But see Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405
N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980); Adler v. Svingas, 80 A.D.2d 764, 436 N.Y.S.2d 719
(1981); Gazda v. Kalinski, 91 A.D. 860, 458 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1982).
[Vol. 49
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new trend, in Gaiter v. Galler," the Illinois Supreme Court upheld
a shareholder agreement specifying numerous dividends and a sal-
ary to an employee's widow. 4' The court determined that the need
of the close corporation for flexibility outweighed a firmly en-
trenched policy of the board of directors exclusively making policy
decisions requiring dividends and salaries. Noting that "there has
been a definite, albeit inarticulate, trend toward eventual judicial
treatment of the close corporations as sui generis,' ' 3 the court con-
cluded that it could "no longer fail to expressly distinguish be-
tween close and public-issue corporations where confronted with
problems relating to others."" The court reached this conclusion
even though the Illinois business corporations statutes do not dis-
tinguish between close corporations and publicly held corporations.
The Galler case demonstrates the trend toward courts upholding
shareholder agreements which deprive the board of managerial
powers.' 5 It is not safe, however, to conclude that shareholder
agreements are always enforceable as several courts have not fol-
lowed this trend. 6
2. Judicial Trends in Montana
Montana courts have followed the trend of fashioning special
rules to meet the unique needs of close corporations. The Montana
Supreme Court in Skierka v. Skierka Bros. Inc.,"' Fox v. 7L Bar
Ranch, Inc.,'48 and Maddox v. Norman,'4 demonstrated its willing-
ness to treat close corporations by different standards than pub-
licly held corporations." In recent years, the Montana Supreme
Court has addressed the treatment of shareholders in a close cor-
poration more often than virtually any other state supreme court.
In Skierka, a widow and her daughter brought an action
41. 32 IIl. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
42. Id. at 34, 203 N.E.2d at 587.
43. 32 Ill. 2d at 28, 203 N.E.2d at 584.
44. 32 Ill. 2d at 31, 203 N.E.2d at 585.
45. Cressy v. Shannon Cont. Corp., 170 Ind. App. 224, 378 N.E.2d 941 (1978); Halla-
han v. Holton Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 68, 385 N.E.2d 1033 (1979); Henderson v. Joplin, 191
Neb. 827, 217 N.W.2d 920 (1974); Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d
199 (1980); Jones v. Wallace, 48 Or. App. 213, 616 P.2d 575 (1980).
46. See supra note 40. The Montana Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed
this issue since the beginning of this trend.
47. - Mont. -, 629 P.2d 214 (1981).
48. 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982).
49. - Mont. - , 669 P.2d 230 (1983).
50. In an additional recent case, Gray v. Harris Land & Cattle Co., - Mont....
737 P.2d 475 (1987), where the case validated stock transfer restrictions, the court again
dealt with the rights of shareholders in a close corporation.
1988]
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against her brother-in-law, who controlled the corporation, for op-
pressive acts, among other things. The Montana Supreme Court
sustained the trial court's holding that the following acts amounted
to oppression:
-the brother-in-law dominated the management of the
corporation;
-the brother-in-law refused to create an executive vice president
position for the widow with power equal to his as president; and
-the brother-in-law refused to agree to reasonable stock valuation
required by stock transfer restriction in the bylaws.
The defendant undoubtedly argued, because he was the major-
ity shareholder, that there was no statutory or common law duty to
allow the minority shareholders to participate equally. The court,
without determining whether the decisions made by the majority
shareholder were in fact in the best interest of the corporation,
held that the majority shareholder oppressed other shareholders.
The court found oppression, as defined by section 35-1-921 of the
Montana Code Annotated,5" based solely on its finding that the
minority shareholders were excluded from management. 3 Al-
though all shareholders were board members, the court concluded
that the majority shareholders still excluded the minority share-
holders from management by consistently defeating their propos-
als. Candidly, the court held that "[o]ppression may be more easily
found in a close-held, family corporation than in a larger public
corporation." 4 The court justified the ruling, stating that "[b]y its
very nature, intracorporate problems arising in a close corporation
demand the unusual and extraordinary remedies available only in
a court of equity. ' 55 The "intracorporate problem" referred to by
the court was the problem caused by common management and
ownership. Although the. shareholders expect to manage the corpo-
ration by consensus, the statute forces the shareholders to operate
with a board of directors acting on majority vote.56 The court con-
51. There was a separate issue whether there was fraud and mistake in the formation
of the corporation and whether plaintiffs really understood they would be minority stock-
holders. - Mont. at - , 629 P.2d at 218-20.
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921(i)(a), (ii) (1987) provides the court may liquidate the
corporation if oppression is found.
53. __ Mont. at -, 629 P.2d at 221.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Thisted v. Tower Mgmt. Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 14, 409 P.2d 813, 820
(1966)).
56. The board of directors' powers, however, may be restricted (MONT. CODE ANN. §
35-1-515 (1987)) and provisions can be made altering a pure majority vote (such as a unani-
mous vote or super majority). MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-405 (1987).
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cluded that unless the parties could agree to the appropriate divi-
sion of the corporation's property, the proper remedy for oppres-
sion was the draconian remedy of liquidation. 7
In a second case, Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch,58 the Montana Su-
preme Court again treated close corporations differently than their
publicly held counterparts. Fox involved a dispute between family
members over the operation of a close corporation. The court held
that one faction of the family oppressed the other by excluding
them from the management of the corporation. This oppression,
according to the court, justified a dissolution of the corporation.
The case is significant because it developed a "'fiduciary duty' of
good faith and fair dealing owed by a majority shareholder to the
minority." 59 Oppression, the court held, should be measured by the
"reasonable expectations of the minority shareholders in light of
the particular circumstances of each case." ' Because disputes are
analyzed on a case-by-case basis, the court stated that it would
consider the "special circumstances" underlying close corporations,
including the shareholders' expected right to management and
right to dividends. 1
Specifically, the court noted:
[t]he logic which supports judicial reluctance to interfere with
dividend policies in large corporations does not apply to close cor-
porations. Management in large corporations has no incentive to
deny adequate dividends, for such a policy would result in low-
ered stock prices and the danger of a proxy fight or a takeover.
However, in close corporations the dividend policy often reflects
the personal financial needs of the controlling shareholders, and
no market exists to reflect the dissatisfaction of other sharehold-
57. - Mont. at -, 629 P.2d at 222.
58. 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982).
59. Id. at 209, 645 P.2d at 933 (citing Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358
(Mo. App. 1976); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 629-30, 507 P.2d
387, 394 (1973)).
60. Fox, 198 Mont. at 209-10, 645 P.2d at 933 (quoting In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25,
-, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing
Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW. 873, 886 (1978); Afterman, Statutory
Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for Reform, 55 VA. L. RIv. 1043,
1063-64 (1969)). This type of standard was subsequently used by the court in defining the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in commercial transactions. See Nicholson v.
United Pac. Ins. Co., __ Mont. -, 710 P.2d 1342 (1985).
61. Fox, 198 Mont. at 210-11, 645 P.2d at 933-34. Traditionally courts have been hesi-
tant to order corporations to pay dividends, even though the shareholders may expect pay-
ment. See Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REv. 85 (1980); Fischel,
The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REV. 699 (1981). See also Santarelli
v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1959); Kohn v. Birmingham Realty Co., 352 So. 2d 834,
836 (Ala. 1977). But see Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977)
(case discusses special dividend considerations in close corporations).
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ers with this policy."2
Because the relationship of shareholders in a close corporation re-
sembles the relationship of partners, 3 the court determined that
the majority faction of the family had improperly excluded other
family members from a voice in management and denied them a
financial return. 4 The court, citing Skierka, articulated reasons for
the rationale that oppression may be more easily found in close
corporations.6 5 When a public market exists, a dissatisfied share-
holder may always sell his or her shares. Because shares in a close
corporation do not have a public market, shareholders' oppression
is more likely to exist. Without a public market, dissatisfied share-
holders are left with little recourse other than petitioning a court
for dissolution under the provisions of the Montana Business Cor-
poration Act.66 Hence, unless the minority shareholders' dissolu-
tion option is viable, the law enables unscrupulous majority share-
holders to squeeze out minority shareholders.6 7
A year after Fox, the Montana Supreme Court decided the fi-
nal case in the trilogy of close corporation cases. In Maddox v.
Norman,"s the court considered the problems of another ranch cor-
poration where family members had split into factions. Again, the
plaintiff argued that one faction was oppressing the other faction
and requested a dissolution pursuant to the provisions of the Mon-
tana Business Corporation Act. In this case, the court refused to
order a liquidation 9 because the ranch was an ongoing business
and the court feared that the majority shareholders would lose the
full value of their investment upon liquidation. Instead, in an ex-
traordinary step, it fashioned a remedy not contemplated by the
dissolution provisions of the Montana Business Corporation Act."0
The court ordered the corporation to purchase the minority share-
holders' stock to alloW the majority shareholders to benefit from
62. Fox, 198 Mont. at 212, 645 P.2d at 934-35 (quoting Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 280 (1967)).
63. Fox, 198 Mont. at 212, 645 P.2d at 935 (citing In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, -,
433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHARE-
HOLDERS § 7.14, at 521-22 n.7 (2d ed. 1975)).
64. Id. at 210, 645 P.2d at 934.
65. See supra text accompanying note 54.
66. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921 (1987).
67. Fox, 198 Mont. at 209, 645 P.2d at 933. See also F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINOR-
ITY SHAREHOLDERS § 2.15; Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 154-
55, 400 A.2d 554, 560-61 (1979). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-404 (1987).
68. - Mont. -, 669 P.2d 230 (1983). This case was remanded and subsequently
reviewed by the court on a related issue. - Mont. -, 697 P.2d 1368 (1985).
69. Id. at __, 669 P.2d at 237-38.
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921 (1987).
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"the rightful fruits of their labors on the ranch while still allowing
for a full accounting for corporate funds. '71 The court properly jus-
tified this extraordinary action by relying on its power to elect
from a broad range of equitable remedies. Again, as in Skierka, it
noted that by their "very nature, intracorporate problems arising
in a close corporation demand the unusual and extraordinary rem-
edy available only in a court of equity.1' 2
C. Problems Not Adequately Addressed by the Legislature and
Courts Until the MCCA
While the Montana legislature and the Montana Supreme
Court have, prior to the MCCA, sheared the corners from the peg
by taking positive steps to recognize and remedy the problems of
close corporations, they remain unable to force the square peg into
the round hole. Three problems remained until passage of the
MCCA: (1) the failure of the statutes to deal with the core
problems of close corporations; (2) the failure of corporations to
use the protections provided by statute; and (3) the lack of guid-
ance for the court as to equitable remedies available to resolve
shareholder disputes.
1. Failure of the Model Business Corporation Act to Take Into
Account the Needs of Close Corporations
Before the adoption of the MCCA, the Montana Business Cor-
poration Act failed to address all of the special needs of a close
corporation. Although the authors of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act later updated the Model Business Corporation Act to ad-
dress some attributes of an incorporated partnership, it still fell far
short of addressing three concerns of a close corporation. The
Montana Business Corporation Act never fully considered the
needs in a close corporation for (1) retaining limited liability for
shareholders even though corporate formalities are not strictly fol-
lowed, (2) managing the corporation by consensus rather than an
elected board of directors, and (3) providing a mechanism to keep
control with the original group of owners.
a. Failure to Follow Formalities
Most close corporations neglect to follow all of the formalities
required by the Montana Business Corporation Act. While most
71. Maddox, __ Mont. at -, 669 P.2d at 238.
72. Id. at __, 669 P.2d at 237 (quoting Thisted v. Tower Mgmt. Corp., 147 Mont. 1,
14, 409 P.2d 813, 820 (1966)).
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close corporations do elect a board of directors and officers, many
of these corporations fail to hold the required routine and formal
meetings of directors and shareholders. In addition, these close
corporations often informally and unlawfully delegate power away
from the board and into the hands of the shareholders. By acting
without formal authorization from the board of directors, the of-
ficers compound the problem of disregarding the statutory require-
ments. The result of these actions is twofold: an increased risk that
the court will pierce the corporate veil, and increased confusion
about whether corporate acts are effective because the acts are the
result of unlawful delegation of corporate power.
Courts scrutinize a corporation's failure to follow all corporate
formalities when analyzing whether the corporation is an alter ego
or a mere instrumentality of its owners.73 A finding by the court
that one or more persons controlled or influenced the corporation
is not enough to justify piercing the corporate veil. 74 Rather, "it is
[also] necessary to demonstrate that the corporate cloak is utilized
as a subterfuge to defeat public convenience, to justify wrong or to
perpetrate fraud. '7 5 Under the MCCA, a provision specifically
states that failure to follow the corporate formalities will not ex-
pose the corporation to liability from piercing the corporate veil,7 6
thereby reducing the risk that a court will disregard the corporate
veil.
Shareholders create a second problem when they unlawfully
delegate the powers statutorily reserved to the board of directors,
shareholders or others. Arguably, because the law prohibits a board
of directors from delegating its powers, actual contracts purporting
to transfer the power are invalid.7 As a result, contracts made by
individuals without lawful power may not be enforceable unless
made with apparent authority or by actions subsequently ratified
73. See Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Montana, 44 MONT. L. REv. 91, 96
(1983) (authored by Jody J. Brewster). See also E.C.A. Envtl. Management Servs., Inc. v.
Foenyes, - Mont. -, 679 P.2d 213 (1984); Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 561, 223 P.
490, 497 (1924); Hanson Sheep Co. v. Farmers & Traders State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 336, 163
P. 1151, 1154-55 (1917).
74. Meridian Minerals Co. v. Nicor Minerals, Inc., - Mont. - , 742 P.2d 456
(1987); State ex. rel. Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 309, 124 P.2d 994, 996
(1942).
75. E.C.A. Envtl. Management Servs., Inc., - Mont. -, 679 P.2d 213 (1984);
Monarch Fire Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 113 Mont. 303, 308, 124 P.2d 994, 996 (1942). See also
Wortman v. Griff, 200 Mont. 528, 535-36, 651 P.2d 998, 1004 (1982).
76. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-306 (1987).
77. See Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823
(1953); Wheeler v. Layman Found., 188 Ga. 267, 271, 3 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1939).
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by the contract.78
While the corporation may delegate much of the authority of
the board to executive committees or to a designated individual,79
close corporations usually fail to formally delegate the authority as
required. By allowing shareholders to operate the corporation
without a board of directors (or with a board of directors with lim-
ited power), the MCCA simply codifies the common corporate
practices into the statute.80
b. Management by Consensus
Although the Montana Business Corporation Act mandates
that the board of directors manage the corporation,"1 in practice
the shareholders in a close corporation usually manage the corpo-
ration. As in a partnership, the owners expect to operate the busi-
ness by consensus and expect that they will be operating the busi-
ness with those people they know and trust. Partnership law allows
the shareholders to realize their expectations of consensus deci-
sion-making, because if partners do not operate by consensus, any
one partner is able to dissolve the partnership at will.82 Partners
can expect to continue doing business with those they know and
trust because all partners must consent to the admission of a new
partner. 83 Unfortunately, these expectations of the owners are frus-
trated in a close corporation. Absent an enforceable shareholder
agreement, virtually all decisions are made by the will of the
majority.
At common law, attempts to transfer control from directors to
shareholders were often voided because they were against public
policy. 4 Although section 35-1-515 of the Montana Code Anno-
tated allows the articles of incorporation to provide for a dimin-
ished role of a board, the statute is seldom used because of the
liability it imposes upon shareholders who consent to the transfer
of management power.
78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-10-403 (1987).
79. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-407, -515 (1987).
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301(2)(b) (1987).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401 (1987).
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-603(1)(b) & (2) (1987). While the partnership law pro-
vides for control by majority vote (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-401(8) (1987)), a disgruntled
individual partner is able to dissolve the partnership. As a result, in order to hold the part-
nership together, there is an incentive to reach a consensus.
83. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-401(7) (1987).
84. See supra note 40.
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c. Limitation on Transfer of Stock
Absent an agreement, shareholders may convey stock volunta-
rily, by bequest, or involuntarily by court order in divorces, fore-
closures and bankruptcies. These conveyances may result in in-
compatible owners, which can be potentially disastrous to the
corporation. A shareholder agreement, while often complex and ex-
pensive to draft, may include an adequate provision to restrict
share transfer. The MCCA, by taking into account the specific
needs of a close corporation, severely curtails the ability to transfer
shares,85 and thus insures control of the corporation within the
original group of shareholders.
2. Failure of Close Corporations to Use the Montana Business
Corporation Act to Structure Properly Incorporated Partnerships
Many attorneys, before the enactment of the MCCA, could
structure a close corporation to operate as an "incorporated part-
nership" through the use of shareholder agreements and special
provisions in the articles and by-laws. While once hesitant to en-
force the agreements forcing corporations to act like partner-
ships,"6 the courts are now less hesitant to do so.8 ' Unfortunately,
not all clients follow their attorney's advice to enter into the ap-
propriate shareholder agreements at the time of incorporation. Cli-
ents too often request only "bare bones" articles of incorporation
from their attorneys to minimize the costs.88 Clients, anxious to file
articles of incorporation, do not heed warnings of potential
problems that may arise later. Unfortunately, the next visit to the
attorney is often prompted by a problem that could have been
avoided by the proper agreements.
The formation of a corporation by owners of a business with-
out consulting a lawyer is even more problematic than the "bare
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202 (1987).
86. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra, note 36, § 275, at 744-45. See Sensabaugh v. Polson
Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1959); Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599,
608, 123 A.2d 893, 898, modified, 36 Del. Ch. 102, 125 A.2d 588 (Ch. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 136 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New
Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 179, 77 N.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1948).
87. See also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 36, § 275, at 745-46; Clark v. Dodge, 269
N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936); Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684, 428
N.Y.S.2d 199, 203 (1980). See note 40 supra.
88. In a study of 900 South Carolina articles of incorporation, only 26.8 percent used
any of these optional provisions allowed by law in the articles. See Haynsworth, The 1981
Revision of the South Carolina Corporation Business Act: A Critique and Agenda for Fur-
ther Reform, 33 S.C.L. REV. 449, 461 n.49 (1982).
[Vol. 49
17
Bahls and Quist: The ABA Model Statutory Close Corporation Act: A New Opportunity for "Made In Montana" Corporations
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1988
MONTANA CLOSE CORPORATIONS
bones" incorporation by an attorney.89 Airline magazines and fi-
nancial publications offer "do-it-yourself' incorporation kits that
do not even begin to protect the interests of shareholders in a close
corporation. These publications often fail to inform shareholders-
to-be of special problems of operating a close corporation like an
"incorporated partnership."
The corporations which are unwilling to accept or pay for the
qualified legal advice benefit from the MCCA. By merely electing
the MCCA, these corporations adopt many of the provisions of the
Act which effectively permit operation of an "incorporated part-
nership." The MCCA, specifically designed for the particular needs
of close corporations, addresses important considerations of man-
agement and succession of ownership.90 The MCCA also provides
protection for those who disregard the corporate formalities by op-
erating the corporation like a partnership.91
3. Failure of Montana Business Corporation Act to Provide
Guidance to Courts When Applying Equitable Remedies
The Montana Supreme Court in Maddox went beyond the
remedy described by the Montana Business Corporation Act when
it ordered the defendant majority shareholders to purchase the
shares of the plaintiff minority shareholders. In that case, although
the plaintiff vigorously argued that the court lacks the power to
compel a stock sale, the court relied on rulings of out-of-state cases
to fashion an equitable remedy."
While the Montana Supreme Court appears willing to order
one shareholder to repurchase the shares of another, the court has
not provided a clear list of alternative equity remedies to consider
when owners of corporations do not get along.9 3 Although courts in
other jurisdictions have sanctioned alternative equitable remedies
such as the appointment of provisional directors or removal of duly
elected directors who are not acting in the interest of the corpora-
89. According to a recent study conducted in the state of Wisconsin, 27 percent of
those who incorporate businesses do not consult lawyers. Comment, Assessing the Utility of
Wisconsin's Close Corporation Statute, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 811, 828 n.91 (1986) (authored by
Mike Harris).
90. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-202 to -204 (1987) essentially provide a right of first
refusal on the transfer of stock. A single statement in the articles of incorporation may also
provide for a compulsory purchase of shares after death. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-205
to -208 (1987).
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-306 (1987).
92. Maddox v. Norman, - Mont. -, -, 669 P.2d 230, 237-38 (1983).
93. It has, however, cited the Oregon case of Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc.,
264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973) which enumerates various equitable remedies such as ap-
pointment of a provisional director. See Maddox, - Mont. -, 669 P.2d 230.
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tion,94 Montana courts have not yet done so. By enacting the
MCCA, the legislature is directing the court to consider other equi-
table powers in resolving disputes in close corporations. These
broad powers enable the court to consider the needs and expecta-
tions of the shareholders without resorting to the drastic options of
compelling share purchase or liquidation. These options, provided
in the MCCA, include cancellation or alteration of provisions in
the articles of incorporation or by-laws, the appointment of a pro-
visional director, or the appointment of an individual as officer or
director. 5 While the courts conceivably have these powers already,
the MCCA will minimize any qualms the court might have in in-
voking these equitable remedies. 6
In addition to providing a list of the type of relief the court
may order, the law grants the court some guidance in applying the
relief in two significant respects. 7 First, the legislation states that
a court may fashion the equitable remedies if those in control of
the corporation act illegally, oppressively, fraudulently or with un-
fair prejudice. The Montana Business Corporation Act dissolution
provision on its face does not allow the court to dissolve a corpora-
tion if the majority shareholders' acts are unfairly prejudicial.9 8 As
a result of the addition of the term "unfairly prejudicial," courts
will no longer be required to stretch the definition of oppression to
include action which is more easily characterized as "unfairly prej-
udicial."9 9 Some scholars objected to the addition of the term "un-
fairly prejudicial" because the MCCA fails to define the term. '00
The law, however, should not attempt a rigid definition, but rather
the courts should determine what is unfairly prejudicial by consid-
94. See Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973);
Roach v. Margulies, 42 N.J. Super. 245, 126 A.2d 45 (1956). See Comment, The Custodian
Remedy for Deadlocks in Close Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 498 (1980) (authored by
Cheryl Jean Lew).
95. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-502, -503 (1987).
96. See ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 40, at 1852-55 (corresponding
to MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502 (1987)). For a discussion of how legislation affects the equi-
table powers of a court to settle disputes between shareholders, see G. Hornstein, A Remedy
for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority
Shareholder, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 220, 243-49 (1940).
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501(I)(a) (1987).
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921 (1987).
99. The term "unfairly prejudicial" is not found in the provisions of the Montana Bus-
iness Corporations Act. The MCCA only authorizes the court to exercise equitable jurisdic-
tion. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921(1)(a)(ii) (1987) allows the Court to liquidate a corporation
if "the acts of the directors or those in control ... are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent."
100. Kessler, The ABA Close Corporation Statute, 36 MERCER L. REV. 661, 692 (1985)
suggests it has "somewhat lower pain threshold than 'oppression'-although perhaps only
the difference between a thumb screw and the 'iron maiden.'"
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ering the facts and circumstances in each individual case. 1 '
The forced buy-out and dissolution provisions of the MCCA
provide a second, but no less significant area of guidance by pro-
viding that a forced buy-out or dissolution is only appropriate
when less drastic forms of relief are ineffective in providing re-
lief.10 2 The Model Business Corporation Act grants the courts only
the remedy of dissolution. Those courts willing to consider other
equitable remedies had no guidance for determining whether disso-
lution or some other less drastic equitable remedy should be ap-
plied. Pursuant to the MCCA, courts are directed not to order a
dissolution or buy-out if remedies such as appointment of a provi-
sional director, cancellation of corporate actions or bylaw provi-
sions, and payment of dividends are appropriate.
III. IMPACT AND PROPER USE OF THE MCCA
A. Share Transfer Restrictions
The share transfer restrictions of the MCCA provide a right of
first refusal to the corporation when a shareholder desires to trans-
fer any shares.1 0 3 The restrictions become automatically effective
when the provisions of the MCCA are adopted.' 4 Simply put, the
restrictions require all shareholders to offer their stock to the cor-
poration before they sell the stock to a nonqualifying transferee,' 5
as defined by the MCCA. The corporation then has the option to
purchase the shares from the shareholder for the same price and
terms as offered to the third party.
The right of first refusal generally provides an excellent way to
insure that the control of the corporation remains within the origi-
nal group of owners or their relatives. The Montana Business Cor-
poration Act permits other ways of accomplishing the same goal,
such as restrictions on transfers of stock without the consent of the
other shareholders or absolute restrictions on the transfer of stock
to certain classes of potential shareholders.0 6 Although allowed by
the Montana Business Corporation Act,'0 7 practitioners do not
favor absolute restrictions and consent restrictions because the re-
striction makes the stock almost impossible to transfer and se-
101. ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 40, at 1852-55.
102. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-503, -504 (1987).
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-203 (1987).
104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(1) (1987).
105. A nonqualifying transferee is any person who fails to qualify under MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-9-202(2) (1987).
106. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-617 (1987).
107. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-617(3)(c), (d) (1987).
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verely impacts the value of the stock.
1. Problems With Using Rights of First Refusal
The right of first refusal described in the statute, like all rights
of first refusal, has inherent weaknesses. Many of those weaknesses
have been mitigated by the statute. Attorneys may further miti-
gate the problems through proper planning.
a. Difficulty in Locating Buyers For The Stock in a Close Corpo-
ration
As a closely knit group, owners of close corporations find it
difficult to encourage third parties to invest in a corporation where
they might be viewed as outsiders and have little control in man-
agement. Any right of first refusal, including that found in the
MCCA, creates difficulties for a shareholder who desires to sell his
or her shares because the burden remains on the shareholder to
find a buyer. If shareholders desire to sever their connection with
the corporation, they are often unable to find a market for their
stock. This inability to find a buyer frequently leaves shareholders
with no alternative but to enter into an agreement with the corpo-
ration whereby the corporation buys the stock at a bargain price. 08
The MCCA mitigates this problem when a shareholder dies by per-
mitting an election to allow the shareholder's estate to compel the
corporation to purchase the deceased shareholder's stock at a mar-
ket price. Shareholders may further ameliorate the problem by en-
tering into a shareholder agreement providing that upon the retire-
ment of a shareholder, the corporation will purchase the
shareholder's shares.1 "9
b. Difficulty in Obtaining a Firm Offer For Stock Subject to The
Right of First Refusal
Any buyer interested in purchasing the stock of a close corpo-
ration must invest significant time and expense investigating the
business and assessing its value. Frequently the prospective trans-
feree hires an attorney or accountant to assist with the analysis. If
the possibility exists that their efforts will only result in fixing the
108. Often, at the same time, the corporation does not pay dividends or employ the
shareholder, making it easier to squeeze out a minority shareholder. See 1 F. O'NEAL, OP-
PRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 2.15, at 2-38 and -39 (2d ed. 1985).
109. Care must be taken when defining the term retirement. Some agreements allow
shareholders to retire before age sixty-five, but at a substantial reduction in the purchase
price for the shares.
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stock price for someone else, the prospective buyer will resist in-
curring this expense. The MCCA cannot provide a mechanism to
resolve this problem because it is inherent in the right of first re-
fusal. Shareholders should be aware of the problem, but the advan-
tages of allowing the original group of owners to retain control of
the corporation usually outweigh this disadvantage.
c. Possibility of Collusion Between Transferor and Transferee
May Defeat the Right of First Refusal
The possibility exists with most rights of first refusal thAt a
transferor and transferee will agree on a high transfer price, which
could effectively prevent the beneficiary of the right of first refusal
(the corporation in the case of the MCCA) from exercising its op-
tion. If a shareholder and transferee collude to create an artificially
high price, the effectiveness of a right of first refusal might be frus-
trated. For example, if the fair market value of the share to be
transferred is $10,000, and a shareholder wishes to convey the
shares to his friend, the shareholder might obtain a $20,000 offer
(paid in two yearly installments of $10,000) from his friend. The
high purchase price may serve to discourage the beneficiary of the
right of first refusal from purchasing the stock. Later the share-
holder may "forgive" the last $10,000 installment. The actual
purchase price, then, was only $10,000 and the beneficiary could
have purchased the shares had it known of the actual purchase
price. To avoid this problem, the terms of the right of first refusal
could require the purchaser to make a cash offer. The disadvantage
of requiring a cash offer, however, is that a shareholder desiring to
sell his or her stock may not be able to find a cash offer or the
corporation may not be able to match the cash offer.
The MCCA does not specify the remedies available if a share-
holder and proposed transferee engage in the type of collusion de-
scribed, but presumably an action would be available against the
colluding shareholders based on theories of fraud"' or constructive
fraud."' In Montana, this type of collusion could support an argu-
110. "One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it,
is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused by his justifiable reli-
ance upon the misrepresentation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
111. If the element of fraudulent intent is difficult to prove, the beneficiaries of the
right of first refusal might rely on MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-406 (1987) which provides that
constructive fraud consists of "any breach of a duty which, without an actually fraudulent
intent, gains an advantage to the person in fault. . . by misleading another to his prejudice
or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him." For a further discussion of constructive
fraud, see McGregor v. Mommer, - Mont. - ,.714 P.2d 536, 543 (1986); Mends v.
19881
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ment that the shareholders breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing both pursuant to the Uniform Commercial
Code1 12 and the separate tort action recognized by the Montana
Supreme Court"'3 and by statute."1 The statutory right of first re-
fusal conceivably createZ a right similar to a contract right between
the parties, thus invoking the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to govern the transaction. If the selling shareholder
colludes with another, the selling shareholder's conduct departs
from the justifiable expectation of the beneficiaries of the option
and violates the seller's duty to act with honesty-in-fact and with
commercial reasonableness. Conceivably, the beneficiary of the
right of first refusal could actually recover possession of the shares
under theories of a constructive trust.115
d. Inability to Transfer Shares to Children
A right of first refusal, which does not provide for exceptions,
makes it impossible to maintain equal ownership among families in
a multiple family corporation. When the members of one family
die, without modification of the right of first refusal, the corpora-
tion maintains the option to buy the stock. Accordingly, the family
may lose, against its will, its ownership interest in the corporation.
A simple solution to this problem, adopted by the MCCA, is to
allow transfers, free of restrictions, to certain family members.11
Attorneys and clients should appreciate that share transfer re-
strictions in the form of a right of first refusal are no panacea.
Nonetheless, rights of first refusal may represent the best balance
between the need to restrict transfers of shares to outsiders and
the need to allow disgruntled shareholders to realize a market for
their shares. All things considered, the MCCA has gone about as
far as possible in eliminating or mitigating the problems with a
Dykstra, 195 Mont. 440, 637 P.2d 502 (1981); Moschelle v. Hulse, __ Mont. - ...
622 P.2d 155, 159 (1980). The duty breached, of course, is the fiduciary duty between share-
holders of a corporation described in Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch, 198 Mont. 201, 209, 645 P.2d
929, 933 (1982).
112. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-201(19), -203 (1987).
113. See Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., - Mont.., -, 720 P.2d 1148, 1152-
53 (1986); McGregor v. Mommer, - Mont. -, , 714 P.2d 536, 542-43 (1986); Thiel
v. Johnson, - Mont. .. 711 P.2d 829, 832-33 (1985); Nicholson v. United Pac.
Ins. Co., - Mont. - , , 710 P.2d 1342, 1346-48 (1985).
114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-211 (1987).
115. See B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. Boggs, 439 F. Supp. 738, 752, (E.D. Penn. 1977); Hig-
gins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 279 F.2d 46, 52-54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 899 (1960).
See also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 172, 194, 201 (1937); Raestle v. Whitson, 119 Ariz.
524, 528, 582 P.2d 170, 174 (1978).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(2)(b) (1987).
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right of first refusal.
2. Drafting Considerations of Share Transfer Restrictions
Although the right of first refusal provisions apply to all cor-
porations electing the coverage of the MCCA, the articles of incor-
poration may contain provisions altering the terms of the right of
first refusal included in the MCCA.' 7 Likewise, if the shareholders
or their attorney feel more comfortable with share transfer restric-
tions which are entirely different than the statutory scheme, the
corporation's articles of incorporation may provide that the statu-
tory scheme does not apply."'
Those organizing corporations under the MCCA should con-
sider the following modifications to the right of first refusal provi-
sions contained in the MCCA. These modifications are most appro-
priately made in the articles of incorporation."'9
(a) Exceptions to Restrictions
Commentators have appropriately criticized the MCCA for al-
lowing too many transfers free from the right of first refusal. 20
One target of their criticisms is the provision which allows free
transfers between shareholders. Attorneys and clients may not de-
sire this exemption because such intrashareholder transfers may
117. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202 (1987).
118. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(1) (1987). At least one author has criticized the pro-
visions of the ABA Supplement because it may "lead away from thoughtful planning on an
ad hoc basis." Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation Act and A Proposed
Legislative Strategy," 10 J. CORP. L. 817, 834 (1985). Professor Bradley also argues the
MCCA may "influence inexperienced planners to take the lure of the minor cost saving in
reliance on the representation that the substance of the statutory restriction adequately
meets the needs and expectations of the shareholder." Professor Bradley's comments are
well taken, if attorneys do not customize the restrictions of MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-201 to
-203 (1987) to the needs of their clients. The restrictions contained in MONT. CODE ANN. §§
35-9-201 to -203 (1987), however, are better than no restrictions on transfer and are a good
starting point for drafting restrictions. See also Haynsworth, Competent Counseling of
Small Business Clients, 13 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 401 (1980).
119. The MCCA provides that transfers of stock may not be made except as permitted
by the MCCA or "permitted by the articles of incorporation." MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-
202(1) (1987). The MCCA also provides that the restrictions do not apply to certain classes
of transferees "[e]xcept to the extent the articles of incorporation provide otherwise." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(2) (1987). Any doubt that the statutory provision can be modified
should be dispelled by the Comments to the ABA Supplement: "The statutory prohibition
can be limited or modified simply by stating in the articles of incorporation that it does not
apply or by specifying in the articles of incorporation the changes from the statutory lan-
guage" (emphasis added). ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 11, at 1817. The
provision is drafted, according to the Comment, to "facilitate alteration in order to fit the
special needs of the shareholders in a particular corporation." Id. at 1816.
120. See Bradley, supra note 118, at 682.
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alter the control of the corporation between shareholders or groups
of shareholders. 121
Another potentially troublesome exception, found at section
35-9-202(2)(b) of the Montana Code Annotated, allows unencum-
bered transfers to shareholders' family members. Frequently,
shareholders from different families intend to operate the corpora-
tion "in partnership" only with those individuals they know and
trust. The original shareholders may not feel comfortable doing
business with their fellow shareholder's spouse or child. Incorpora-
tors should seriously consider limiting the relatives to whom shares
may be transferred to a specified group or to those relatives al-
ready employed by the business.12
2
(b) Alteration of Payment Terms
The provisions of the MCCA requiring the corporation to
match the terms of the proposed transferee's offer could cause cash
flow problems for the corporation desiring to exercise the option.
The problem becomes particularly acute when the proposed trans-
feree offers to pay for the transferor's stock with cash at closing. If
the corporation elects to purchase the stock, it must also pay cash
at closing. To avoid a cash flow problem within the corporation,
incorporators should consider allowing the corporation a period of
time, perhaps three to five years, to pay the purchase price. Incor-
porators might provide for the corporation to pay the purchase
price over a specified number of years or over the time period pro-
posed by the transferee, whichever is longer. Of course, adequate
provisions should also provide for the payment of interest. The
corporation, however, may not grant a security interest in the cor-
poration's assets to secure payment to the selling shareholder pur-
suant to the terms of section 35-1-711(4) of the Montana Code
Annotated.
B. Compulsory Purchase of Shares After Death of Shareholder
To conform the structure of a close corporation more closely
121. For example, if A, B, and C each own one-third of the stock in ABC Corporation
and A transfers his or her stock to B, then B suddenly becomes a majority shareholder
without C's consent. The articles of incorporation found at Appendix II of this article cor-
rect this problem by providing that the restrictions on transfer do apply to intrashareholder
transfers. See infra text accompanying note 241.
122. At first blush, it may be tempting to undo the exception which allows transfers to
administrators of estates free from restriction under MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(2)(d)
(1987). Those administrators, however, are prohibited from making further transfers to
nonexempted persons. ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 11, at 1816.
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to that of a partnership, the MCCA allows statutory close corpora-
tions to elect to provide a deceased shareholder's estate with the
option of compelling the corporation to purchase the deceased's
shares. 23 The right provided by the MCCA is similar to the right
of the estate of a partner to require partners desiring to continue
the business to purchase the estate's interest for fair value. 2 " The
MCCA provides the option to sell to the estate of the deceased
shareholder without providing the corporation with a similar op-
tion to purchase the deceased's shares. In addition, the MCCA also
includes a mechanism whereby the estate and corporation bargain
for a mutually agreeable purchase price. If the parties are unable
to agree upon a price, the court will fix the amount of the price of
the shares. 2 5 In addition, the by-laws or a shareholder agreement
may also fix the price.2
The threshold question faced by attorneys and their clients is
whether the close corporation should elect these mandatory
purchase provisions. 27 If the parties' sole desire is to prohibit
transfers of the shares to undesirable parties upon the death of an
owner, the election of the mandatory purchase provisions is unnec-
essary because the right of first refusal provision adequately pro-
tects shareholders. 28
The primary reasons to elect a mandatory purchase option are
to provide (1) a market for the owner's stock upon his or her
death 29 and (2) a method for an orderly termination of the rela-
tionship between the continuing shareholders and the estate and
heirs of the deceased shareholder. 30 A substantial amount of liti-
gation is generated in the state of Montana between heirs of a de-
ceased shareholder and continuing shareholders.'' Rarely does a
shareholder contemplate his or her own death, so all too often the
123. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-205 (1987) provides that administrators of the estate of
a shareholder, may require repurchase of the deceased's share upon the shareholder's death.
124. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-614 (1987).
125. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-207(2) (1987).
126. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-206(5) (1987).
127. The election must be included in the articles of incorporation. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-9-205(1) (1987).
128. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-205(1) (1987) grants the option to compel purchase to
the estate, not the corporation. As such, the estate remains bound by the share transfer
restrictions for sale of shares to others than the corporation. See also ABA SUPPLEMENT
COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 14, at 1824.
129. This allows the estate to realize the value of the decedent's portion of the busi-
ness. See Younger, Death and the Close Corporation, 34 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1967).
130. ABA Supplement § 14 (corresponding to MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-205 (1987)).
See ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 14, at 1824.
131. Maddox v. Norman, - Mont...., 669 P.2d 230 (1983) and Skierka v. Skierka
Bros., - Mont. -, 629 P.2d 214 (1981).
1988]
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shareholders face a fellow shareholder's death without any agree-
ment about the relationship between shareholders after the
death.1"2 Often the deceased shareholder was the glue holding the
corporation together. After the shareholder dies, the positions of
the remaining shareholders might harden, communications may
break down and litigation may be the result.133
Like the right of first refusal provisions, attorneys and their
clients should not adopt the mandatory buyout provisions without
consideration of the appropriateness of the provisions for the indi-
vidual corporation. Instead of the MCCA mandatory buyout provi-
sions, a shareholder agreement may more appropriately meet the
needs of the shareholders.
The primary disadvantage created by a mandatory purchase
option is that the purchase may create a substantial financial bur-
den on the corporation. Frequently, small corporations are not liq-
uid. The corporation may have difficulty borrowing money to fi-
nance the purchase of a deceased shareholder's stock if the
corporation does not have assets to pledge. Lenders may also balk
at financing and harbor concern about the continued viability of
the corporation.
Life insurance on an owner's life or a key employee of the bus-
iness provides the easiest solution to the problem of financing the
acquisition of the stock upon a shareholder's death. In some situa-
tions, obtaining life insurance is easier said than done. Insurance
companies may refuse to insure shareholders because of age or
health. Insurance coverage may also be prohibitively expensive for
the fledgling corporation. Without life insurance, the corporation
might solve the problem by agreeing to pay the repurchase price
over a period of years to an estate upon the death of a shareholder.
Often a three to five year period will frequently allow enough time
for the corporation to generate enough cash from earnings to sat-
isfy the obligation to the deceased shareholder's estate.
While the mandatory purchase provisions of the MCCA pro-
vide benefits that are usually provided by shareholder agreements,
they do not replace shareholder agreements which contain death
provisions tailored to the needs of a corporation. The mandatory
buy out provisions are best thought of as a "back up" when share-
132. "Persons who have been active or dominant in the affairs of a business corpora-
tion may find it difficult to contemplate the termination of their influence even after death."
Younger, Death and the Close Corporation, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 12 (1967). The death of
the shareholder may also mean the loss of a major asset of talent, business skills or
expertise.
133. See J. Bahls, Preventing Partnership Disputes, FARM FUTURES 29 (March, 1987).
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holders fail to enter into the appropriately negotiated shareholder
agreement."' Attorneys should consider not electing the provisions
of sections 35-9-205 to -207 of the Montana Code Annotated and
instead customizing the shareholder agreement to the specific cor-
poration. Specifically, attorneys may want to include the following
provisions in shareholder agreements that are often more appropri-
ate for a close corporation:
(1) A provision allowing the corporation to compel the estate
to sell the shares of the corporation to the corporation. Currently
the MCCA merely provides that the shareholder maintains the
option.'"5
(2) A provision granting the corporation or shareholders the
option to compel a purchase of stock upon other events such as
the shareholder's retirement, termination of employment, disabil-
ity or loss of professional license.'3 Retirement provisions are
particularly appropriate for a business engaged in personal ser-
vice in order to reward long-term employees. At the same time,
these provisions encourage senior employees to retire at the ap-
propriate age, so younger employees might have management
opportunities.
(3) A provision allowing payment over time (with interest) if
life insurance proceeds are not enough to fund the purchase.
Without this provision in the agreement, pursuant to the MCCA,
the court may order that this purchase be made either immedi-
ately or over time.'37 If the parties agree in advance to make the
payment over time, then it is wise to avoid the risk that the court
will require cash payments.
(4) A provision defining some method, other than a court de-
termination, to determine the value of the shares. Methods to es-
tablish price might include formulas, 138 book value, adjusted book
134. The Official Comments to the ABA Supplement state that the mandatory buy-
out provisions are appropriate in the event the shareholders have "failed" to enter a share-
holder agreement, "failed" to agree on a price or "neglected to provide" necessary terms.
ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 14, at 1825.
135. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-205(1) (1987).
136. Providing for these contingencies may easily be done within the framework of the
MCCA and without a separate agreement. The mandatory purchase provisions of the
MCCA may be expanded by amending the articles of incorporation to provide coverage for
these contingencies. ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 14, at 1823.
137. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-207, -503(2)(b) (1987).
138. Not all businesses, of course, are capable of being valued in accordance with a
formula. Trade associations gather information about appropriate formulas. Addresses and
phone numbers of these trade associations may be found in GALE RESEARCH Co., ENCYCLOPE-
DIAS OF ASSOCIATIONS (20th ed. 1986).
Clients must use care when using formulas because accepted formulas for valuing busi-
ness in a specified industry may change as competitive conditions change. Further, the cli-
ent's business may not be a typical business in the industry. For example, competitive con-
ditions and markets in Montana may be different from these businesses in urban areas from
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 49 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol49/iss1/8
94 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
value, 139 non court-appointed appraisers,'40 and annual agreement
of the shareholders.1
41
Non-judicial methods of setting the price are often superior to
relying on a judicial determination as contemplated by the
MCCA.142 Not only do the parties save the costs of litigation,
which include the cost of hiring appraisers as expert witnesses, but
which and for which the formulas may have been devised. Formulas are frequently inappro-
priate in valuing shares upon the death of a shareholder because the death may have a
substantial impact on formula variables. For example, the death of a key salesperson-owner
is sure to have a negative impact on sales of the business. In that case, if a formula bases its
valuation on historical sales, the result is likely to be misleading.
139. Extreme care should be used if book value or adjusted book value is adopted as
the purchase price. Although one of the easiest ways to establish a purchase price, book
value is one of the least reliable ways to establish a purchase price. Book value takes into
account the historical price of assets and does not attempt to gauge fair market value. In
order to remedy this problem, attorneys frequently provide for purpose of the valuation, the
appraised value of land, equipment and investments will be used to determine book value.
Use of book value valuations also fails to take into account the value of goodwill because
goodwill is not typically valued on the balance sheet. Contingent liabilities are not usually
considered when computing book value. Book value, in some businesses, is distorted by arbi-
trary (but not capricious) accounting concepts such as election of "last in, first out" methods
of inventory valuation. Finally, book value is often adjusted to exclude the amount of life
insurance proceeds realized by the corporation as a result of the shareholder's death.
When book value is used, there is frequently a dispute whether the parties are bound
by their agreement if book value bears little relation to market value. Generally, courts have
held that a disparity between the option price and the fair market value at the time of the
buyout will not invalidate the restriction. Stech v. Panel Mart, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982) (purchase price $250, fair market value $1,250); Elson v. Schmidt, 140 Neb.
646, 653, 1 N.W.2d 314, 316-17 (1941); Renberg v. Zarrow, 667 P.2d 465, 470 (Okla. 1983)
(purchase price $3,500, fair market value $31,300). See also Howeth v. D.A. Davidson & Co.,
163 Mont. 355, 370, 517 P.2d 722, 730 (1973). If fraud, overreaching or bad faith exists at
the time the agreement is made, however, the purchase provision may be invalid. Renberg,
667 P.2d at 470.
140. These non-court-appointed appraisers could be named in the agreement, selected
upon mutual agreement of the estate and corporation or selected by a knowledgeable
trusted third party such as the corporation's accountant or primary loan officer.
141. Annual agreements of shareholders of the value of the stock in the company are
frequently more reliable than a court valuation, because, in many businesses, shareholders
are most familiar with the true value of their business. If the annual valuation method is
used, care should be taken to provide all shareholders must agree to the valuation. Failure
to require unanimous agreement may result in healthy shareholders agreeing to an artifi-
cially low price in order to prejudice a shareholder on his or her deathbed. Provisions must
also be made for those corporations where the shareholders are not able to reach a unani-
mous decision or fail to make yearly valuations. These "back-up" methods include use of a
formula, adjusted book value, or non-court appraisal.
142. Valuation decisions are difficult for anyone to make:
The valuation of a company or a business is not an exact science; considering the
same relevant facts, experts may differ widely in their appraisals of value. This is
understandable because of the many factors generally involved in reaching a deci-
sion or overall valuation. The weight given these factors is a matter of judgment
G. MCCARTHY & R. HEALY, VALUING A COMPANY 4 (1971).
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the parties also retain control over appraisers and the appraisal
method. Although the MCCA provides guidance to the courts con-
cerning some of the factors to consider when valuing shares, '43 the
statute does not direct the court to use a particular method of val-
uation (asset valuation, earnings valuation, etc.)."' Nor does the
MCCA give the courts any guidance concerning any discounts that
might be applied to the valuation. For example, shareholders may
agree in advance whether to discount the value of a minority inter-
est of shares. Discounts for minority shares, because of the lack of
marketability, range from 10 percent to 50 percent.'45 The Mon-
tana Supreme Court has not used any specific guidelines when de-
termining whether to use a discount for minority interests. In di-
vorce actions, for example, the Montana Supreme Court recently
upheld a valuation of a close corporation that did not apply a mi-
nority discount ' because the district court was given broad au-
thority to determine value. Courts, when determining the appro-
priateness of a discount for a minority interest, should look to the
facts and circumstances to determine the expectations of the par-
ties.14 7 If the shareholders are able to agree, in advance, whether or
not to discount a minority interest, it behooves them to specify the
agreement to minimize the risk that a court would fail to follow
the parties' wishes.
Shareholders should always make plans for the death of a
shareholder. While the scheme set forth in the MCCA'"8 provides a
method for determining the price and terms of a buyout, share-
holders are advised to carefully consider which scheme is the most
appropriate based on their own needs. With careful consideration,
separate shareholder agreements might better provide for the con-
tingency (and eventuality) of death.
143. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-207, -503(2)(a), (b) (1987).
144. For a good discussion of the methods of valuation and factors to be taken into
account see Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
145. See McCARTHY & HEALY, supra note 142, at 4.
146. In re Johnston, __ Mont. -, - 726 P.2d 322, 325 (1986). See also Bux-
baum v. Buxbaum, - Mont. -, , 692 P.2d 411, 414 (1984); Burleigh v. Burleigh,
200 Mont. 1, 650 P.2d 753 (1982).
147. Factors that might be examined include whether the shareholders intended to be
equal managers of the corporation, whether any single shareholder has control, or whether
the shareholder bought his or her interest for a price that was discounted as a minority
interest.
148. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-205 to -208 (1987).
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C. Agreements Permitting the Corporation to Operate Like a
Partnership
One of the most significant provisions of the MCCA allows
shareholders to agree to operate the corporation in unconventional
ways, even if operation of the corporation resembles a partnership
more than a corporation. ' 9 The MCCA permits, but does not re-
quire, shareholder agreements which: (1) eliminate the board of di-
rectors; (2) restrict the powers of discretion of the board; (3) au-
thorize director proxies and weighted voting; and (4) allow the
partnership to act as a corporation. In a related provision of the
MCCA, the articles of incorporation may even authorize any share-
holder to dissolve the corporation at will or upon the happening of
a specified occurrence. 150 In the absence of the MCCA, these ar-
rangements may constitute an unlawful delegation of the powers
usually reserved to the board of directors.'
The law requiring shareholders to form a board and to submit
to the majority rule of a board 1 2 has long been criticized by com-
mentators and disregarded by owners of close corporations. 53 As
one commentator ably stated:
Forcing partners who wish to incorporate to submit to majority
rule and the formal mechanics of publicly held corporations will
not contribute an iota to the protection of creditors or to the pro-
gress and stability of the world of business and should not be re-
garded as the quid pro quo for limited liability. 54
The provisions of the MCCA allowing a corporation to operate as a
partnership are not mandatory; rather, shareholders must elect the
149. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301 (1987).
150. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-404 (1987).
151. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401(1) (1987) provides that a corporation, unless the
articles of incorporation otherwise provide, "shall be managed under the direction of the
board of directors." Courts have held that agreements which have the effect of requiring a
corporation to act as a partnership are unenforceable. See, F. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 5.05,
at 5-16. See Sun River Stock & Land Co. v. Mont. Trust & Sav. Bank, 81 Mont. 222, 262 P.
1039 (1928).
152. However, MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-306 (1987) specifically provides that the fail-
ure to observe the usual corporate formalities is not ground for imposing personal liability
on shareholders.
153. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Buxbaum, 137 Mont. 397, 399, 352 P.2d 83, 84 (1960) (failure
to file annual reports); State ex. rel. Foot v. Farmers & Mechanics State Bank, 85 Mont.
256, 259, 278 P. 828, 829 (1929) (failure to issue stock); Scott v. Prescott, 69 Mont. 540, 552-
53, 223 P. 490, 494 (1924); Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers & Traders State Bank, 53 Mont.
324, 331, 163 P. 1151, 1153 (1917) (failure to hold meetings of the shareholders and/or
directors).
154. Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms Versus Needs, 11 U. FLA. L.
REV. 433, 470 (1958).
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individual provisions.155
1. Elimination of the Board of Directors
At first blush, it may appear desirable to eliminate the board
of directors of a close corporation. Small corporations frequently
operate without formal boards. If formal boards are used, they
usually rubber stamp the decisions of the officers or, in some cases,
the dominant shareholder(s). When all the shareholders are direc-
tors, it might seem duplicative to require a board of directors.
Incorporators should exercise caution, however, before doing
away with the board of directors in situations where more than one
shareholder desires to participate in management. The board of di-
rectors, and the associated required meetings, provide a time-
tested manner in which to operate the corporation.156 If the board
is eliminated, it becomes incumbent on the attorney to devise a
surefire method for the shareholders to share control. Failure to do
so will result in the corporate ship operating without the direction
of a helm.1 57
If the corporation is a "one person" corporation, a subsidiary
or a family corporation exclusively managed by one person, there is
no concern about creating an alternative mechanism to share pow-
ers because power is already centralized. As a result, the formality
of the board of directors is probably unnecessary and the incorpo-
rators may wish to operate without a board. A corporation without
a board, however, may encounter some resistance from banks, cus-
tomers, suppliers or governmental entities who are accustomed to
requesting board approval of certain corporate actions. The
MCCA, in recognizing this problem, allows the close corporation to
authorize a "designated director" to sign contracts on behalf of the
corporation.1 5
2. Restrictions on the Power of the Board of Directors
The Montana Business Corporation Act takes virtually all
management away from the shareholders 59 and centralizes the
155. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301(1), (2)(c) (1987).
156. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401 (1987).
157. The MCCA does, in part, address this concern by providing that actions requiring
director vote require a similar shareholder vote if the board is eliminated. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-9-302 (1987). These provisions, however, do not provide the same structure as exists for
calling board meetings and determining quorum.
158. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-302(3)(e) (1987).
159. There are six exceptions to the general rule that shareholders have no voice in
management. Shareholders:
(1) elect directors (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-402 (1987));
19881
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management in the board.16 0 The law governing partnerships, on
the other hand, reserves all powers to the owners.16' Non-manage-
ment shareholders in close corporations frequently desire compro-
mise of the two types of approaches. While shareholders are con-
tent to allow the board of directors to make the management
decisions, they usually desire a vote in decisions other than day-to-
day decisions. These shareholders, of course, become frustrated by
the general rule that the board, and the board alone, manages the
corporation.
Accordingly, MCCA allows corporations to reserve certain de-
cisions to the shareholders. These decisions might include deci-
sions such as whether to:
a. make expenditures in excess of a stated dollar amount;
b. hire or fire employees;
c. enter contracts where performance (by one or both parties
to the contract) is expected to last more than one year;
d. approve loans (other than extension of trade credit in the
ordinary course of business) or guarantee loans;
e. approve changes in product line, location or focus of busi-
ness; or
f. approve sale of assets in excess of a stated amount.
Incorporators might seriously consider restricting the power of
the board of directors when not all shareholders are active in the
business or members of the board of directors. The inactive share-
holders might appropriately desire a veto over major decisions
such as those listed above. Likewise, even if all shareholders are
members of the board of directors, restricting the power of the
board of directors and providing for a supermajority of unanimous
approval of the shareholders for certain transactions provides pro-
tections against a squeeze-out of minority shareholders.
3. Director Proxies and Weighted Voting
Director proxies and weighted voting 162 afford the board of di-
(2) must approve amendments to the articles of incorporation (MONT. CODE ANN. §
35-1-207(1)(c) (1987));
(3) must approve loans to directors (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-415 (1987));
(4) must approve sales of assets (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-809 (1987));
(5) must approve of consolidations and mergers (MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-803
(1987)); and
(6) must approve of granting of stock rights or options (MONT. CODE. ANN. § 35-1-
607(2) (1987)).
160. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401 (1987).
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-401(5) (1987).
162. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301(2)(b) (1987).
(Vol. 49
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rectors additional flexibility. Director proxies allow directors to
convene a quorum even without the required number of directors
present in person at the meeting. The convenience of director
proxies allows one member of a family to grant his or her vote to
another member of the family. Weighted voting eliminates the ne-
cessity to appoint a large board in order to allow each shareholder
to control his or her proportionate share of directors. For example,
if a corporation has a shareholder owning 2/3 of the stock, it is no
longer necessary to have a three-person board in order that the
director may control 2/3 of the vote. Under the MCCA, 16 3 two direc-
tors could be elected, with the shareholder owning 2/3 of the stock
holding twice as many votes on the board as the other shareholder.
4. Other Provisions Authorizing the Corporation to Act as a
Partnership
The MCCA provides that shareholder agreements may also
have the "effect [of] treat[ing] the corporation as a partnership","
or "creat[ing] a relationship among the shareholders . . . that
would otherwise be appropriate only among partners." '165 Neither
the MCCA nor the Comments to the ABA Supplement clearly
states what types of agreements the drafters contemplated. Con-
ceivably, the close corporation could draft a shareholder agreement
to provide for the operation of the corporation under the rules gov-
erning partnerships. These provisions must contain sufficient spec-
ificity to define exactly the management of the business since dif-
ferent partnerships are managed in different ways. A better
approach may be to modify the traditional corporate structure (e.g.
abolishing the board or limiting the power of the board) in order
that the owners clearly understand where their rights and respon-
sibilities differ from the traditional rights and responsibilities of
shareholders and directors.
5. Dissolution at Will Upon Occurrence of Specified Events
One important trapping of a partnership allows any partner to
dissolve the partnership at will.'66 In order for "incorporated part-
nerships" to more closely resemble a true partnership, the MCCA
allows the shareholders (individually or as a group) to dissolve the
163. Id.
164. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301(2)(c) (1987).
165. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301(2)(d) (1987).
166. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-603(1)(b), (c) (1987).
1988]
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corporation at will or upon the occurrence of a specified event.167
Although the law always makes dissolution at will available to a
partnership, it has long been regarded as an undesirable attribute
of operating as a partnership. The persistent threat of dissolution
makes management and operation of the business difficult at best.
Likewise, these provisions grant a disgruntled shareholder the ex-
traordinary leverage of threat of dissolution to use against other
shareholders to coerce them into the dissident shareholders' de-
sired action. 6 ' Unwanted dissolution not only risks a potential fire
sale of the assets, but also risks triggering undesired tax
consequences. 169
In some circumstances, however, the owners of the business
may desire to provide a shareholder with the opportunity to dis-
solve the corporation.170 Such circumstances might include the
start up phase of a personal services close corporation without sub-
stantial assets. Conceivably, shareholders may agree to operate
under the threat of dissolution at will until they feel comfortable
with each other. Usually, however, better ways exist to protect the
interests of the shareholders. The incorporator might prepare
agreements to provide the apprehensive shareholders with an op-
tion to require the corporation to purchase their stock for a fair
market value in lieu of dissolution.' 7' These types of agreements
allow the corporation to continue the business, while providing a
fair return to the unhappy shareholders.
6. Provisions Concerning By-Laws
A Montana close corporation operating under the MCCA may
also dispense with by-laws, if the shareholder agreement or articles
of incorporation contain the provisions required in by-laws. In
Montana, few provisions are required by statute to be included in
the by-laws.1 72 As a general matter, the Montana Business Corpo-
167. ABA Supplement § 33 (corresponding to MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-404(1) (1987)).
See ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 33, at 1824. Any provision must be pre-
sent in the articles of incorporation.
168. These actions might include increases in salary, increased draws, etc. See Kessler,
The ABA Close Corporation Statute, 36 MERCER L. REV. 661, 690 (1985).
169. For a good discussion of the income tax aspects of corporate dissolution after the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, see Brade, General Utilities Repeal: A Transactional Analysis, 66
J. TAX'N 322-28 (1987).
170. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-301(5), -404 (1987).
171. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301(8) (1987) permits these types of agreement between
the shareholders.
172. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-404(2) (1987) (notice and agenda of directors meet-
ings); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-410 (1987) (election of officers); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 35-1-
501(1) (1987) (place of shareholders meetings and date of annual meeting).
[Vol. 49
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ration Act mandates that the by-laws provide for the "regulation
and management of a corporation. '7 3 According to the Montana
Business Corporation Act, most of the regulations governing the
corporations may also be included in the articles of
incorporation. 174
If the optional shareholder agreement which effectively con-
verts the corporation to an "incorporated partnership" contains all
of the terms usually required in by-laws, it becomes superfluous to
use by-laws. However, if the corporation does not operate as a
partnership pursuant to a shareholder agreement, then by-laws are
usually an efficient and effective way to prescribe the management
of the corporation.
In the event that the close corporation dispenses with the by-
laws, the shareholders should make certain the following problems
(typically covered by by-laws, but whose coverage is not mandated)
are addressed in a shareholder agreement or in the articles of
incorporation:
- How certain owners of stock (other corporations, legal represent-
atives, minors, joint tenants and incompetents) vote their shares;
- Whether deadlocks on the board may be submitted to
arbitration;
- Who has the authority to enter into contracts, borrow money,
sign checks;
" What procedure controls the transfer of shares; and
" What procedure governs replacement of lost or stolen stock
certificates.
If the corporation elects to operate without by-laws and under
a shareholder agreement, it should be aware that while by-laws are
usually amended by a majority vote of the directors,175 most share-
holder agreements may only be amended, like any other agree-
ment, by unanimous vote of the shareholders as parties to the
agreement. Therefore, if a shareholder agreement takes the place
of the by-laws, one obstreperous shareholder may block desirable
changes in the shareholder agreement.
173. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-214 (1987).
174. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401 (1987) (qualifications of directors); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-401 (1987) (number of directors); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-403 (1987) (classifica-
tion of directors); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-404(3) (1987) (conference call board meetings);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-405 (1987) (board of director voting requirement); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-406 (1987) (board action without a meeting); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-407
(1987) (board committees); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-408 (1987) (removal of directors);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-501(3) (1987) (who may call special shareholders' meeting); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-505(1) (1987) (quorum requirements for shareholders' meetings).
175. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-214, -405(2) (1987).
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D. Limitation on Courts' Power to Pierce Corporate Veil
Virtually all cases where courts have pierced the corporate veil
involve corporations with one, two or three shareholders or corpo-
rations where shareholders are members of a single family. 176 The
Montana Supreme Court has considered the failure to observe cor-
porate formalities as one factor indicating that the corporation has
become the alter ego of the shareholder(s).177 However, merely be-
cause the court has determined that the corporation is an alter ego
of its shareholders does not justify piercing the corporate veil. The
courts must also determine that disregarding the corporate veil is
necessary to prevent fraud or avoid inequity.17 8 When, for example,
the corporation is undercapitalized, courts have pierced the corpo-
rate veil to prevent inequity. 179 Undercapitalized close corporations
are as common as corporations which ignore corporate formalities.
As a result, many Montana corporations and their shareholders
face the potential of loss of limited liability if an aggressive plain-
tiff has the inclination to pursue the issue. 8
The MCCA effectively minimizes the risk that the court will
pierce the corporate veil not only when a corporation acts like a
partnership, but also when a corporation with a board of directors
does not comply with customary management formalities.18' Mini-
mization of this risk is one of the most significant benefits con-
ferred by the MCCA on close corporations. The MCCA, however,
provides only limited protection. 182 It will not shield a corpora-
176. F. O'NEA, supra note 3, § 1.10, at 1-44.
177. See, e.g., Hansen Sheep Co. v. Farmers & Traders State Bank, 53 Mont. 324, 335,
163 P. 1151, 1154 (1917) (failure to properly utilize board of directors).
178. Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Montana, 44 MONT. L. REV. 91, 97-105
(1983) (authored by Jody S. Brewster).
179. "If the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the business to be done and
the risk of loss, this is ground for denying the separate entity privilege." H. BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 129 at 302-03 (rev. ed. 1946). See Shaffer v. Buxbaum, 137 Mont. 397, 401,
352 P.2d 83, 85 (1960) (where corporate capital was $300 and existing debts were $5,948.77);
Commercial Credit Co. v. O'Brien, 115 Mont. 199, 203, 146 P.2d 637, 639 (1943) (where
corporate capital was $11,174.17 as compared to total assigned receivables being
$183,481,689.92). See also Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Sub-
sidiary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 473, 482-83 (1953). But see Walkovszky v.
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
180. According to Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, the issue of piercing the corporate veil is
one of the most frequently litigated of all issues in corporate law. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 3,
§ 1.10, at 1-39 to 1-40.
181. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-306 (1987).
182. ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 30, at 1843, states that section
1843 of the ABA Supplement (corresponding to MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-401 (1987)) merely
prevents a court from "piercing the corporate veil" because it is a statutory close corpora-
tion. However, the language of the ABA Supplement (and MCCA) does more. The MCCA
provides protection from liability for failure to follow corporate formalities relating to man-
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tion's shareholders from loss of limited liability for ignoring statu-
tory requirements or formalities other than management. For ex-
ample, a court might find that the corporation is the alter ego or a
"mere instrumentality" of its owners if (1) personal funds are com-
mingled with corporate funds; (2) corporate credit is used to fund
personal expenses; or (3) profits of the corporation are distributed
through means other than dividends.
E. Judicial Supervision
Until passage of the MCCA, the Montana Business Corpora-
tion Act provided the courts with very little flexibility in devising
solutions to problems created by shareholder deadlock or oppres-
sion by shareholders.'83 Courts were usually forced to order a dis-
solution of the corporation 184 or, in a few cases, to compel the cor-
poration to purchase an interest of a disgruntled shareholder.18 5
Borrowing provisions from the 1948 English Companies Act, the
MCCA enumerates an additional menu of remedies available when
the court finds fraud, oppression, unfairly prejudicial conduct or
deadlock. Remedies include appointment of provisional directors,
removal of officers or directors, alteration of corporate by-laws or
corporate actions, and payment of dividends.' The court, how-
ever, does not have jurisdiction to intervene if the parties have
agreed in writing to a non-judicial alternative.' 7 The advantage of
providing the court with a clear listing of equitable remedies is
that it will not feel compelled to use its draconian remedies of dis-
solution or compelled purchase of shares. 188
Pursuant to the Montana Business Corporation Act, any
shareholder may petition the court to apply the equitable remedy
of dissolution when the conduct of the majority is illegal, oppres-
sive or fraudulent. 8 9 The MCCA adds "unfairly prejudicial con-
duct" to that list. While it may be difficult to determine exactly
agement for any corporation electing coverage under the Supplement, even if it elects not to
adopt any of the ABA Supplement provisions altering the traditional management scheme.
Hence, even those shareholders in corporations electing to retain a board of directors and
related trappings will be protected from personal liability merely because of the corpora-
tion's failure to follow corporate formalities regarding management.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 92-102.
184. Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch, Inc., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982).
185. Maddox v. Norman, - Mont. ., 669 P.2d 230 (1983).
186. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-501, -504 (1987).
187. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501(3) (1987).
188. For example, the court in Skierka, __ Mont. -, 629 P.2d 214 (1981) could
have simply created a new board position for the minority shareholder, instead of liquidat-
ing the corporation.
189. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921(1)(a)(ii) (1987).
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what effect the addition of the term "unfairly prejudicial"' 0 may
add, the term probably refers to conduct less egregious than fraud-
ulent conduct.'9 The authors of the MCCA properly refrained
from attempting a precise formulation of the term. According to
the Official Comment "[t]hese are elastic terms whose meaning
varies with the circumstances presented in a particular case."' 192
Although the MCCA provides a list of remedies,'93 these reme-
dies do not necessarily tip the scales in favor of the minority share-
holder. The MCCA simply allows (and encourages) the court to use
more creativity and presumably greater equity in fashioning a solu-
tion to the problems of the paralyzed corporation.' The MCCA
also mandates that the two solutions heretofore used by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court and other courts-dissolution' 95  and
mandatory purchase of a disgruntled shareholder's interest' 96-are
to be applied only in extraordinary circumstances. 97
There are minor disadvantages to encouraging the court to use
remedies in addition to dissolution and compelled purchase in
resolving corporate disputes. One fear is that courts may become
unduly entangled in corporate decision-making. No detailed stan-
dards describe when a court should provide each remedy. 9 The
190. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501(I)(a) (1987).
191. See Bradley, supra note 118, at 836. Some might express concern that the addi-
tion of the term "unfairly prejudicial" might allow unhappy minority shareholders more
access to the courts because unfairly prejudicial conduct is less egregious than fraudulent or
oppressive conduct found in MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921(1)(a)(ii) (1987). This concern is
probably misplaced in Montana because the courts already define oppressive conduct as
conduct which violates the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders. Fox, 198 Mont.
at 209-10, 645 P.2d at 933. Likewise, majority shareholders have a fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders. Id. Conduct should not be considered as unfairly prejudicial if there has been
no breach of the majority's fiduciary duty and the reasonable expectation of shareholders
has not been violated.
192. ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 40, at 1852-1955. The ABA Sup-
PLEMENT § 40 corresponds with MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501 (1987).
193. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502(l) (1987).
194. Some commentators have concluded that adoption of provisions such as the
MCCA might imply that the flexible remedies for deadlock and other special provisions may
not be available to non-statutory close corporations. See Karjala, supra note 16, at 1259;
Jordan, The Close Corporation Provisions of the New California General Corporation Law,
23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1094, 1151 (1976). The problem, commonly known as negative implica-
tion problem, is not a problem under the MCCA. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-102(3) (1987)
states that the MCCA "does not repeal or modify any ... rule of law that applies to a
corporation ... that does not elect to become a statutory corporation ...." It is clear that
the enactment did not modify any of the rules of equity heretofore applying to corporations.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 51-67.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
197. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-503(1) (1987).
198. Those drafting the ABA Statutory Supplement purposely omitted detailed stan-
dards of when and how a court should resolve a dispute. A Comment states: "A court should
have broad discretion to fashion the most appropriate remedy to resolve the dispute. What
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concern, however, that a court will become unduly entangled in
management is probably misplaced. Courts have historically hesi-
tated to become overly involved in supervision of corporate man-
agement because courts lack the time and the expertise to manage
a corporation.199 Courts may properly decline to exercise the pow-
ers described in section 35-9-502 of the Montana Code Annotated
if exercising such powers effectively requires them to manage the
corporation. In most cases, the mere threat of court intervention
will encourage parties to resolve their disputes. In the few cases
when a court determines that the operation of the corporation will
require substantial court supervision, court time or business exper-
tise, the court should not become entangled in management but
should take the extraordinary step of resolving the dispute by or-
dering a buyout or liquidation.
IV. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTION TO OPERATE AS STATUTORY
CLOSE CORPORATION
When corporations are operated as partnerships there are two
primary tax concerns; whether the corporations are partnerships or
associations taxable as corporations and whether an S corporation
will lose its status as an S corporation.
A. Status as a Corporation or a Partnership
When structuring a corporation with attributes of a partner-
ship, the incorporators must consider the possibility of changing
the tax status of the corporation to a partnership. The regulations
promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code describe four pri-
mary attributes of associations taxable as corporations: (1) con-
tinuity of life, (2) centralization of management, (3) limited liabil-
ity and (4) free transferability of interest. 00 If the organization
lacks two of the four characteristics described above, then the In-
ternal Revenue Code classifies the business as a partnership. 01
works in one case may not work in another. Detailed standards are not provided since they
might encourage litigation and also unduly restrict the court's discretion." ABA SUPPLEMENT
COMMENTS, supra note 30, § 41, at 1856. The ABA SUPPLEMENT COMMENTS § 41 corresponds
with MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-502 (1987).
199. Courts are reluctant to make business judgments because, as the Court of Chan-
cery of Delaware stated in Puma v. Marriott, - Del. Ch. __ 283 A.2d 693, 696 (1971)
"[a] court is precluded from substituting its uninformed opinion for that of the experienced,
independent board members .... " See also Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973).
200. Treas. Reg. § 301. 7701-1 to -3 (1961). See also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296
U.S. 344 (1935).
201. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1961). The regulations note, however, that "other
19881
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The regulations also provide that local law is not determinative.2 02
Close corporations might lack the attribute of centralized
management because ownership and management are vested in the
same individuals. The Treasury Regulations provide that "an or-
ganization has centralized management if any person (or any group
of persons which does not include all the members) has continuing
exclusive authority to make the management decisions ....
Several cases, however, have held that the relevant question is
whether there is an opportunity for centralized management, not
whether centralized management actually exists.2 0' As a result, it is
an open question as to whether close corporations have the charac-
teristics of centralized management if the board is composed of all
of the shareholders.2 5
The concern is compounded when a close corporation agrees
on restrictions which impinge on a shareholder's free transferabil-
ity of interest because the corporation retains the right of first re-
fusal. According to the Internal Revenue Code Regulations, "[a]n
organization has the corporate characteristics of free transferabil-
ity of interest if each of its members . . . have the power, without
the consent of other members, to substitute for themselves in the
same organization a person who is not a member of the organiza-
tion.''20 6 A shareholder agreement with a right of first refusal cer-
tainly limits the ability of shareholders to transfer shares to the
transferee of his or her choice. As a result, the regulations recog-
nize that a right of first refusal creates a "modified form of free
transferability."20 7 The Internal Revenue Service, in determining
whether the organization qualifies as a partnership or a corpora-
tion, has stated: "the presence of this modified corporate charac-
teristic will be accorded less significance than if the characteristic
[free transferability of interest] were present in the unmodified
form. '20 8 In effect, the regulation counts corporations which use
the right of first refusal as having one half of a corporate attribute
factors . . . may be significant in classifying an organization as an association, a partnership
or a trust." Id. at 301.7701-2(a)(1).
202. Id. at § 301.7701-1(c). ("[T]he term "partnership" is not limited to the com-
monlaw meaning of partnership, but is broader in its scope and includes groups not com-
monly called partnerships.")
203. Id. at § 301.7702(c) (emphasis added).
204. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935); Kurzner v. United
States, 413 F.2d 97, 103, 106 (5th Cir. 1969).
205. See Note, Close Corporations and the Federal Income Tax Laws - Should the
State Label Control? 59 IOWA L. REv. 552, 574 (1974).
206. Id. at § 301.7701-2(c)(1).
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in the first transferability of shares category. As a result, prior to
the enactment of the MCCA, most close corporations possessed at
least two and one-half corporate characteristics. " °9
1. Statutory Corporations Not Electing Optional Partnership
Provisions
There should be no doubt that, by itself, the election of treat-
ment under the MCCA does not jeopardize Internal Revenue Ser-
vice tax treatment as a corporation. The provisions of section 35-9-
203 of the Montana Code Annotated which provide a statutory
right of first refusal are no different from a shareholder agreement
containing a right of first refusal. Likewise, simple election of
treatment under the MCCA does not abolish the board. As a re-
sult, the corporation will still have at least two and one-half corpo-
rate characteristics: continuity of life, limited liability and "one
half' of transferability of interest. 10 Only when the incorporators
elect to operate the corporation without a board and as a partner-
ship, will the significant possibility of treatment as a partnership
arise under the Internal Revenue Code.'
2. Statutory Corporations Electing Optional Partnership
Provisions
Those statutory close corporations electing to operate as a
partnership abolish the board of directors, prohibit the transfer of
shares, and often allow shareholders to dissolve the corporation at
will. As a result these corporations are likely to lack the features of
centralization of management, continuity of life and free transfera-
bility of interest. Because these corporations lack at least two of
the four corporate attributes,"' they are likely to be classified as
partnerships. Given the potential for treatment as a partnership
for tax purposes, traditional partnerships might also consider
209. The characteristics include limited liability, continuity of life and "one half" of
free transferability of interest. As described, it is an open question as to whether close cor-
porations whose shareholders comprise the board are considered to have centralized man-
agement. See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
210. The corporation, even if it retains the board of directors, may not have central-
ized management if all shareholders are directors. See supra text accompanying notes 203-
05. If a close corporation uses a board of directors made up of a group other than all the
shareholders, the corporation will possess three and one-half corporate characteristics.
211. There may, in fact, be an advantage to partnership status after the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. If the MCCA is fully implemented the maximum tax rate for individual part-
ners will be 28 percent and the maximum tax rate for corporations will be 34 percent. I.R.C.
§§ 1, 11 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
212. See supra text accompanying note 201.
1988]
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electing the provisions of the MCCA. To the extent the MCCA al-
lows corporations to act as partnerships, but with the benefits of
limited liability, there may be good reason for partnerships to con-
sider incorporating under the MCCA. These partnerships would
incorporate and adopt a shareholder agreement that provides that
the corporation will act like a partnership. Presumably, if the stat-
utory close corporation operates as a partnership, it is taxed as a
partnership because it will lack at least two of the four attributes
of a corporation. The option of incorporating a partnership is par-
ticularly attractive because many commentators believe that the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 has diminished the advantages of taxation
as a C corporation. 13 Likewise, those partnerships organized as
partnerships instead of S corporations because they do not qualify
as S corporations 214 or are unable to pass through all of their losses
to shareholders because of a limited basis in corporate assets,
should consider incorporating under the MCCA and electing to act
as a partnership.2 By doing so, these businesses may derive the
advantage of being taxed as partnerships, while at the same time
receive the benefits of limited liability under state law.216
Although corporations acting as partnerships are likely to trig-
213. The problems with operating as a C corporation include generally higher tax rates
than individuals and taxation of liquidating distributions. See, e.g., Friedrich, The
Unincorporation of America, 14 J. CORP. TAX. 3 (1987).
214. A corporation might not qualify as an S corporation because it is a member of an
affiliated group, has more than thirty-five shareholders (there is no limit on the number of
shareholders for purpose of electing under the MCCA if the corporation is to be newly in-
corporated) or has ineligible shareholders (nonresident alien, corporate shareholders). I.R.C.§ 1361(b)(1), (2) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
215. The amount of loss which may be deducted by an S corporation shareholder may
not exceed the sum of the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock and the adjusted basis of
the corporation's indebtedness to the shareholder. I.R.C. §§ 704(d), 705(a) (Law. Co-op.
1986). No such limitation exists with respect to partnership. As a result, many organizations
may prefer to operate as a partnership rather than as an S corporation where substantial
losses are expected. Partnerships are, like all taxpayers, limited in the amount of loss that
may be passed through to owners by the "at risk rules." See I.R.C. § 465(b) (Law. Co-op.
1986).
216. What if a sole proprietor incorporates pursuant to the MCCA, abolishes the
board, adopts articles providing that shares are not transferable and that the owner may
dissolve the business at will. Will the business be considered a corporation or a sole proprie-
torship by the IRS? While the answer to that issue is beyond the scope of this article, it is
not unprecedented for a corporation, owned by a single owner, to be considered a sole pro-
prietorship if the corporation does not have the attributes of an association. In Knoxville
Trust Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 616 (1948), the United States Tax Court
considered the case of a corporation owned, managed and controlled by one individual. The
corporate charter was revoked, but the court noted that "[n]either before nor after that time
did it have the essential characteristics of an association." Id. at 622. See also B. BITTKER
AND J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, § 2.07 (3d
ed. 1971).
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ger an audit when a corporation files a partnership return, under
existing Internal Revenue Code regulations, it appears that those
business organizations would have a good chance of prevailing."' 7
Although the Internal Revenue Code seems to provide that a part-
nership is an unincorporated organization,218 the Internal Revenue
Code Regulations2 19 and the courts2 0 adopt a functional analysis
to determine whether a business organization is taxed as partner-
ship or corporation. Since most incorporated partnerships do not
have at least three of the four corporate attributes, the Internal
Revenue Service, under existing regulations, should find that these
organizations are not corporations.
2 21
Although some statutory close corporations might benefit from
classification as a partnership for tax purposes, the Internal Reve-
nue Service treats the conversion from an association taxable as a
corporation to partnership status as a liquidation.222 The deemed
liquidation will result in recognition, at the corporate level, of a
gain or loss as if the corporation sold its assets for their fair market
value. 223 Likewise, shareholders will recognize a gain or loss equal
to the difference between the net fair value of their shares minus
217. The Internal Revenue Service may argue that under the definitions of partner-
ship, state law labels should be important. See O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th
Cir. 1967). This argument, however, is inconsistent with the "functional" test used by the
courts and described in the Regulations. Treasury Regulations state, for example, "the term
'partnership' is not limited to the common-law meaning of partnership, but is broader in its
scope and includes groups not commonly called partnerships." Treas. Reg. § 30, 7701-1(c), 2
T.O. 6503 1960-2 C.B. 413. Several commentators have also concluded that the state label of
a "corporation" does not control the classification of the organization. See Wang, California
Statutory Close Corporation: Gateway to Flexibility or Trap for the Unwary? 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 587 (1978); Note, Close Corporation and the Federal Income Tax Laws-Should
the State Label Control?, 59 IOWA L. REV. 552 (1974); Note, The Pennsylvania Technical
Close Corporation v. Commission of Internal Revenue: A Hypothetical, 31 U. PITT. L. REV.
275, 282 (1969) (authored by Roger E. Wright). See also B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 2.01, at 2-2 n.4 (4th ed. 1979 &
1987 Supp.).
218. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1986) provides a partnership is a "syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization" (emphasis supplied).
219. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, 2 T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 413.
220. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
221. As discussed at notes 200-02, supra, Treas. Reg. § 301. 7701-2, 2 T.D. 6503, 1960-
2 requires that a corporation have more corporate attributes than non-corporate attributes.
Incorporated partnerships are likely to have only one of the four corporate attributes (lim-
ited liability) and lack the other three attributes (continuity of life, centralization of man-
agement, and free transferability of interest).
222. Rev. Rul. 63-107, 1963-1 C.B. 71 states: "In those cases where an organization
properly classified as an association taxable as a corporation amends its operating agree-
ment so that thereafter it is properly classified as a partnership, the change in status is
treated as the liquidation of a corporation." Id. at 72.
223. I.R.C. § 336(a) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
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the basis of their shares.2 The disadvantage of the taxes associ-
ated with the deemed liquidation may well outweigh any advan-
tages of the subsequent tax classification as a partnership.
As stated by Professors Bittker and Eustice, "the area has
long been marked by fluidity, confusion and controversy. ... Un-
til Congress responds with more elaborate guidelines .. . life in
this area will continue to be difficult for taxpayers, the Treasury
and the courts. '2 5 States such as Montana, which allow business
organizations to operate as partnerships, but still enjoy the bene-
fits of limited liability, may cause the Internal Revenue Service, or
Congress, to rethink and clarify the regulations and Code in this
area.
B. S Corporation Status
Certain shareholder agreements allowed under the MCCA
might create another tax problem if the Act or the shareholder
agreements effectively create more than one class of stock by defin-
ing different rights among shareholders. If a corporation has more
than one class of stock, it will lose the benefit of its S corporation
tax election. 28
The critical issue when determining if there is more than one
class of stock is whether the "outstanding shares of the corporation
[are] identical as to the rights of the holders in the profits and in
the assets of the corporations. 22 7 Those restrictions contained in
the nonelective provisions of the MCCA do not modify the rights
to profits or assets and thus do not jeopardize the S election. Sim-
ple agreements creating a right of first refusal do not create a sec-
ond class of stock because they do not modify individual share-
holder's rights to the profits and assets of the corporation.22' The
same reasoning holds true, according to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, if the corporation or other shareholders have the right to buy
a shareholder's stock in the event of death, disability or termina-
224. I.R.C. § 3 31(a) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
225. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 217, § 2.01, at 2-4.
226. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (Law Co-op. 1986). The result, of course, is that the corpo-
ration's income and losses would no longer be passed through to the shareholders and the
corporation would not be treated similar to a partnership.
227. Committee Report, Senate Explanation (b) 1982 Subchapter S Revision Act as
reprinted in 8 P.H. Federal Taxes 33, 317.21 (1987).
228. Rev. Rul. 85-161, 1985-2 C.B. 191. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,129,116 (Apr. 27,
1981); 8,407,082 (Nov. 17, 1983); 8,405,077 (Nov. 2, 1983); 8,432,024 (May 3, 1984); 8,506,114
(Nov. 19, 1984); 8,528,049 (Apr. 17, 1985). The Internal Revenue Service has also ruled that
agreements requiring payment of dividends to all shareholders as well as restricting transfer
of stock do not create a second class of stock. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,540,062 (July 9, 1985);
8,432,024 (May 3, 1984); 8,411,057 (Dec. 13, 1983).
[Vol. 49
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tion of employment. 29 Provisions reallocating management powers
within the corporation should not create two classes of stock be-
cause they are similar to provisions depriving shareholders of a
vote. The Internal Revenue Code provides that depriving the
shareholders of a vote does not create a separate class of stock.2 30
Likewise, abolition of the board of directors and management of
the business like a partnership does not modify the rights to profit
or assets. Only in the unusual case when the attorney drafts a
shareholder agreement that creates two classes of shareholder
rights to profits or assets does the attorney need to be concerned
about jeopardizing the S corporation election.
V. CONCLUSION
Close corporations should seriously consider incorporating as a
statutory close corporation pursuant to the MCCA.2 1 There are
several advantages of electing to incorporate under the MCCA, ir-
respective of the optional elective provisions. The disadvantages
associated with the MCCA for many businesses are inconsequen-
tial as compared to the advantages to a Montana close
corporation.2 3 2
229. Rev. Rul. 85-161, 1985-2 C.B. 191.
230. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1986) provides that a corporation will not be
considered to have more than one class of stock solely because of differences in voting
rights.
231. The authors of this article do not, however, wish to create a presumption for
attorneys and clients to automatically elect coverage under the optional provisions of the
MCCA. For example, whether a corporation should elect the compulsory purchase provi-
sions upon death or the partnership provisions is best decided on a case-by-case basis. Cor-
porations which qualify for the benefits of the MCCA but are not true close corporations
may not desire to elect coverage of the MCCA. Corporations that are not true close corpora-
tions are those corporations where the ownership and management of the corporation actu-
ally are separate. See supra text accompanying note 4. These corporations may desire the
formality of the Model Business Corporation Act and may not desire to limit the transfera-
bility of shares.
232. There have been a number of commentators who have criticized the provisions of
close corporation supplements. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.19, at 1-95 to 1-103; Brad-
ley, supra note 118, at 845-47. These criticisms include arguments that the ABA Supple-
ment is not mandatory for close corporations, do not provide more protection for minority
shareholders than the Model Business Corporation Act, fail to provide standardized forms
for use by shareholders and do not modify the business judgment rule. Although all of these
criticisms are subject to debate, it is important to note these criticisms focus on problems of
close corporations with which the ABA Supplement might have dealt with but did not. The
thrust of these criticisms is the ABA Supplement did not go far enough, but these authors
would most likely concede the ABA Supplement is a step in the right direction.
In states allowing corporations to be treated as statutory close corporations, a minority
of eligible corporations have so elected. See 1 F. O'NEAL supra note 3, § 1.18. The reasons
for the relatively small number of elections are difficult to ascertain. Based on one of the
author's experience in the private practice of law in Wisconsin, which has adopted the varia-
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Clearly, the MCCA is appropriate for those corporations which
desire the added flexibility of operating without a board of direc-
tors. In fact, without the provisions of the MCCA, the court might
not enforce shareholder agreements altering the statutory scheme
of board of directors' control of a corporation. " '
Most corporations, however, will desire to continue using
traditional forms of corporate management, including the board of
directors. The MCCA benefits these corporations, even though
shareholder agreements may confer several of the same advantages
conferred by the MCCA. 's The following benefits, not available
with the Montana Business Corporation Act, are usually sufficient
to justify election of the MCCA, even by those corporations which
have an attorney able to draft the appropriate shareholder
agreement.
(1) Increased Protection from Piercing the Corporate Veil.
The degree of protection from the threat of the court disregarding
the corporate veil is modest, but significant. ' At the least, the
enactment of section 35-9-306 of the Montana Code Annotated is
a legislative indication that if the corporation's primary sin is dis-
regard of corporate formalities, the court should not pierce the
corporate veil.
(2) Legislative Mandate to Use Less Severe Remedies in
Shareholder Disputes. Because the Montana Supreme Court has
been quick to find oppression when the reasonable expectations
of the minority shareholders are not met, it is important that the
court have the power to apply remedies other than the drastic
remedies of compelled purchase or dissolution. The MCCA di-
rects the courts to apply less severe remedies such as payment of
dividends or modification of a corporate action when these less
severe remedies are appropriate.
The disadvantages of electing the provisions of the MCCA are
few. A majority shareholder may find the MCCA's attempt to pro-
vide the minority shareholder with additional remedies undesirable
when majority shareholder's conduct is unfairly prejudicial. In re-
ality, the degree to which the scales are tipped toward additional
tion of the ABA Supplement, attorneys in that state did not use the ABA Supplement until
they had the time to become familiar with it. This article and the forms in the Appendix are
an effort to make it easier for Montana practitioners to learn about and use the ABA
Supplement.
233. See Sensabaugh v. Poison Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1959).
234. Examples include the right of first refusal and certain restrictions on the power of
the board.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 177-82.
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shareholders' rights have been properly described as "modest. 2 36
It may be considered another disadvantage that the MCCA re-
quires the incorporator to tailor the incorporation documents to
the individual needs of each corporation. "Custom tailoring," how-
ever, is usually required on any close corporation and always pays
off in the end. To minimize this possible disadvantage, suggested
articles of incorporation and a checklist are found in the Appendi-
ces to this article.
The benefits of the MCCA for corporations owned by one per-
son, one family or a small number of individual owners are evident.
Less obvious, but equally significant, are the advantages for sub-
sidiary corporations. Under the MCCA, the parent corporation is
no longer required to provide separate management for a subsidi-
ary.237 Like any other corporation incorporating under the MCCA,
the parent corporation shareholder may elect to manage the sub-
sidiary corporation.
The MCCA gives a corporation the tools with which to tailor
the charter documents and shareholder agreement of a close corpo-
ration to the desires of its owners. Adopting the appropriate provi-
sions of the MCCA will provide benefits to the great majority of
Montana close corporations. 23 8 The flexibility provided by the
MCCA is, however, one of its greatest pitfalls. Those close corpora-
tions seduced by the temptation to elect, without analysis, cover-
age of the MCCA and its optional provisions may have done them-
selves a disservice. Not all provisions of the MCCA are appropriate
for all corporations. In order to maximize the benefits of the
MCCA, the incorporators carefully should analyze the MCCA. The
MCCA does not eliminate the need for preincorporation planning,
but rather underscores that need.
236. Bradley, supra note 118, at 836. See also supra note 191.
237. Wilson v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 116 Mont. 424, 427, 154 P.2d 265, 267 (1944); Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. O'Brien, 115 Mont. 199, 203, 146 P.2d 637, 639 (1943).
238. One commentator has even suggested that failure to consider the benefits of the
ABA Supplement borders on violation of the attorney's duty to evaluate all forms of busi-
ness organizations when analyzing an entity selection question. See Comment, Assessing the
Utility of Wisconsin's Close Corporation Statute: An Empirical Study, 1986 Wis. L. REV.
811, 830 (1986) (authored by Mike Harris).
19881
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APPENDIX I
Montana Close Corporation Incorporation Checklist












Must contain one of these:
Professional Corporation or P.C.
2. Name of any predecessor partnership or other organization:
B. Registration of Other Names
1. Registration of farm or ranch name:
] 30-13-112




4. Livestock mark or brand:
]] 81-3-101
C. Principal Montana Office:
D. Articles of Incorporation ] 35-1-202
1. Date To Be Filed: Not Before:
After:
2. Election of Corporation
Close Corporation ]) 35-9-103 (available for 25 or fewer
shareholders for existing corps., no limit for new corps.)
Business Corporation
Professional Corporation
3. Period of Existence 1] 35-1-202(l)(b)
Perpetual
Other:
4. Purpose 1] 35-1-202(1)(c)
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"any and all lawful business for which corporations may be
incorporated under Title 35, Chapter 1, of the Montana Code
Annotated."
Professional corporation for the practice of
Other
5. Powers ]] 35-1-202(2)
unlimited
limited 1]) 35-1-202(2) -- list limitations
6. Stock 1 35-1-601
Class Series Number of Shares No Par or
Par Value
7. Share transfer restrictions 1] 35-9-201, 202 through 204
restriction should also apply to these transfers (must so
state in articles)
transfers between shareholders
transfers between family members
others: list
other modifications
payment terms (e.g. 5 years or term in proposed
offer whichever is longest)
other:
8. Optional right of shareholder's estate to compel buy-out
Use MCCA scheme (provide statement of election in articles of
incorporation) ]1 35-9-205
Use Shareholders Agreement (provide details in shareholders
agreement section)
No optional right of shareholder's estate to compel buy-out
9. Preemptive Rights )] 35-1-511
Grant rights (must include statement in articles)
Deny rights
10. Optional Provisions (check those desired)
Elimination of Board of Directors (MCA ]) 35-9-301(4))
If the board of directors is eliminated, specify:
Terms of shareholders agreement specifying how
corporation is to be managed:
Names of Designated Directors,
MCA 1) 35-9-302(3)(e)
Limitation on mandatory indemnification
3 35-1-414
- Requirement that shareholder must amend bylaws ]1 35-1-214
1988]
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(otherwise directors may amend the bylaws)
11. Registered Agent 1] 35-1-305:
12. Registered Office ]] 35-1-305:
13. Directors:
Number of Initial Directors:
Name Directors:
Name Address
Board is abolished - Designated Director:
14. Incorporators (Need one or more)
15. Method of Amendment of Articles ] 35-1-507
(a) Generally
Majority vote of shareholders
2/3 vote
80_ vote
(b) Supermajority required for
amendment of preemptive provisions - specify
other actions requiring supermajority
16. Computation of fees:
Filing fee $20.00
License fee *
Total fee to Secretary of State
* Minimum fee is $50.00. The minimum fee of $50.00 authorizes 50,000
shares of no par stock or $50,000 shares of stock of $1.00 par value.
E. Bylaws 1) 35-9-303
No By-laws (requires detailed shareholder agreements)
33 35-9-303(l)
Adopt By-laws
1. Annual Meeting ]] 35-9-304(1)
First Business Day after May 31st ] 35-9-304(1).
Other: Specify: -- day of week
-- week of month
-- month of year
No Annual Meeting 33 35-9-304(2)
2. Board of Directors Deadlock Resolution Provision.
Yes -- specify provisions:
3. Board of Directors Meetings Permitted by Phone?
Yes. See MCA 33 35-1-404.
No.
4. Quorum Requirements ()]3] 35-1-405, -505) for Directors
majority (standard)
other (higher than majority)
5. Quorum Requirements for Shareholders
majority (standard)
1/3 (minimum for shareholders)
other
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6. Removal of Directors ] 35-1-408
(a) Shareholders vote needed to remove entire board
2/3 vote of corporation with 100 or more
shareholders or majority with fewer than 100
shareholders
other (may increase vote specified above, must note
in Articles)
(b) Removal of individual member of board
2/3 of vote of shareholders
other (may increase vote specified above, must note
in Articles)
7. Required notice of meetings
(a) Directors ]) 35-1-401
not less than 48 hours if by telegram and 5 days by mail
other
(b) Shareholders
not less than 10 days nor more than 50 days before the
meeting, 13 35-1-502 (may not be modified)
8. Committees 1 35-1-407.
Board of Director's committees not authorized (no bylaws
needed)
Board of Director's committees authorized with limits
set forth in the statute
Board of Director's committees authorized with limits in
addition to those set forth in statute. Specify (e.g.
must be approved of by shareholders).
9. Amendment of Bylaws, ]) 35-1-214.
2/3 vote of shareholders (must be provided for in
Articles)
majority vote of shareholders (must be provided for in
Articles)
majority of directors may amend subject to shareholder
reversal
F. Special Shareholders Agreements Authorized by Title 35, Chapter 9, ]3 35-9-
301
elimination of board of directors 11 35-9-301(2)(a)
limit/restrict powers of the board of directors
1 35-9-301(2)(b). Explain how:
authorize director proxies 1] 35-9-301(2)(b)
weighted voting rights )] 35-9-301(2)(b)
treat corporation like partnership 3] 35-9-301(2)(c)&(d). Explain
how.
provision allowing one or more shareholders to dissolve
corporation. Explain how:
modification of statutory right of first refusal contained in ]]
35-9-202 (statement required in articles of incorporation).
Explain modification:
Modification of mandatory purchase on death in 33 35-9-205
(statement required in articles of incorporation.)
Additional Agreements. Explain:
G. Initial Minutes




Montana Law Review, Vol. 49 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol49/iss1/8
118 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
2. Form of stock certificate
blank forms filled in by attorney
commercial printed forms
3. Subscription agreements:
No. of Class of Purchase Total Purchase
Name Shares Shares Price/Share Price Paid
4. Description of assets (other than cash) to be transferred:
5. Description of liabilities to be assumed:
H. Miscellaneous Items
1. Primary banking facilities:
for purpose of checking account: (name & address of bank)
Who may withdraw:
Number of signatures required:
for purpose of borrowing: (name & address of bank)
Amount borrowed:














4. S Corporation election (IRS Form 2553)
No
Yes
(a) Shareholder Name SSN Tax Year
(b) Effective date of election:
(c) Earliest of following dates: 1) Date corporation first had
shareholders; 2) date corporation first had assets; 3) date
corporation first did business:
Election for state purposes to be filed. MCA 1] 15-31-202.
5. Applications for
Federal employer I.D. No. SS-4
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6. Employment Agreement
For:
7. Change and/or review lease agreements
For:
8. Change and review contracts with outside clients/business





director and officers errors and omissions
bonding of employee
medical and accident carrier
property/casualty insurance
10. Other discussions (initial to indicate discussion)
need to capitalize
need to recognize corporate formalities
attorney acting as intermediary
termination of close corporation ]) 35-9-403
limitation on extent of limited liability
11 35-9-306 (e.g. problems with undercapitalization)
share transfer restrictions (inherent limitation to right of
refusal) 11 35-9-202
share compulsory purchase right upon death H1 35-9-206
11. Attorney to:
provide and compile minute book
provide and prepare stock certificates
order corporate seal
send out reminders (to corporate president) of annual
meetings
add to firm mailing list for updates
12. Agreed upon fee:
Frequency of billing:
Retainer Agreement sent -- on file
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Executed by the undersigned person(s) of legal age, for the purpose of forming a Montana
corporation under the "Montana Close Corporation Act," Title 35, Chapter 9 of the Montana Code
Annotated.
ARTICLE I
Name. The name of the corporation is
ARTICLE II
Period of Existence. The period of existence shall be __
ARTICLE I
Election of Statutory Close Corporation. Corporation is organized as a statutory close corporation
under Title 35, Chapter 9 of the Montana Code Annotated.
ARTICLE IV
Purpose. The purposes shall be to engage in the business of _ and the transaction of
any or all lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated under Title 35, Chapter I of the
Montana Code Annotated.
ARTICLE V
Stork. (a) The corporation shall have the authority to issue one class of Stock with no par
value. The aggregate number of shares of such Stock which the corporation has the authority to issue
shall be shares.
(b) The following statement shall appear conspicuously on each stock certificate issued by the
Corporation:
"THE RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS IN A STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION MAY
DIFFER MATERIALLY FROM THE RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS IN OTHER CORPORATIONS.
COPIES OF THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AND BYLAWS, SHAREHOLDERS'
AGREEMENT, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, ANY OF WHICH MAY RESTRICT TRANSFERS AND
AFFECT VOTING AND OTHER RIGHTS, MAY BE OBTAINED BY A SHAREHOLDER ON
WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE CORPORATION."
(c) The transfer of the shares of Stock in the corporation are restricted in accordance with the
share transfer provisions of Sections 35-9-202 through 204 of the Montana Code Annotated.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-9-202(2)(a) of the Montaya Code Annotated, the
restrictions on transfer shall apply to transfers to other shareholders.
ARTICLE VI
Preemptive Rights. Should additional Stock be issued at any time, the shareholders at the time of
such issue shall be entitled to a pro-rata share of such issue u41on payment of an amount for each share
of capital stock to be established by the Board of Directors. 
pm
239. The author wishes to thank the Corporation Bureau of the Montana Secretary of State for
reviewing these Articles as to form.
240. The last sentence of Article V(c) should be omitted if shareholders desire to transfer shares
to each other with restrictions. The effect of permitting such transfers is to risk altering the relative
percentages of shareholders. For example, if A, B and C each own one-third of the stock of ABC
Corporation, the MCCA, unless modified, allows A to transfer its shares to B, making B the majority
shareholder. If this scenario is regarded as undesirable, then intra-shareholder transfers should be
subjected to the transfer restrictions by adopting language similar to the last sentence of Article V(c).
241. Shareholders owning stock in Montana corporations do not have preemptive rights to newly
issuied stock unless preemptive rights are mandated in the articles of incorporation. Mont. Code Ann. ]]
35-1-511 (1987). It is the sense of the authors that preemptive rights are appropriate for most close
corporations to assure that shareholders will have the option of maintaining their prorata interest in the
corporation. Usually shareholders expect to have the right to retain their relative ownership
percentages in the corporation.
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MONTANA CLOSE CORPORATIONS
ARTICLE VII
REsisteres Agent and Office. The address of the initial registered office of the corporation is 1
, and the name of the initial registered agent at such office is
ARTICLE VIH
Directors. The number of the directors shall initially be _ and may, from time to time, be
changed by an amendment of the By-laws. The names and addresses of the persons who are to serve as










Amendment. Article VI of these Articles of Incorporation may not be amended except by an
affirmative vote of the shareholders owning _% of the shares entitled to vote upon the amendment.
24 4
This Article of the Articles of Incorporation may not be amended except by the affirmative vote of
shareholders owning % of the shares entitled to vote upon the amendment. Article III, Article V(b)
and Article V(c) of these Articles of Incorporation may not be amended except by an2IWrmative vote of
the shareholders owning two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote on the amendment.2 All other
Articles contained here may be amended by an affirmative vote of the shareholders owning a majority of
the shares entitled to vote on the amendment.
DATED: , 19_
243. The elective provisions of the MCCA (abolition of the Board, dissolution at will of
shareholders, etc.) should be adopted here. Introductory language might state
"The option provisions of the Montana Close Corporation Act, elected by the corporation are."
244. Article VI (Preemptive Rights) is designed to provide protection to minority shareholders.
The provisions should not be amended except by a supermajority vote.
245. The election of the Montana Close Corporation status may not be revoked except by vote of
two-thirds of the shareholders. Mont. Code Ann. 1] 35-9-402 (1987). Likewise, Article V(b) and V(c)
also relates to close corporation status.
19881
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